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ABSTRACT
This article argues that the process of globalization has generated a legitimation 
deficit that can be the source of wasteful, even destructive, social and political 
conflict.  I stylize this outcome as “the PetroChina Syndrome,” after a leading 
example of the kind of activity generated in response to globalization, the 
PetroChina Campaign, where a coalition of labor, human rights, environmental, 
anti-slavery and religious groups worked together to oppose the initial public 
offering of a major Chinese oil company led by Goldman Sachs.   The article 
begins with a discussion of this important but largely unexplored dimension of the 
anti-globalization era triggered by the 1999 demonstrations in Seattle against the 
World Trade Organization.  The Campaign and its impact are discussed in detail.  
I then examine three possible arguments that shed some light on this 
development, including traditional securities law approaches, the broader political 
context and, finally, structural changes in corporate finance. These three 
arguments, I argue, are helpful but not sufficient.  Recent work by the economist 
Massimo De Angelis on John Maynard Keynes and Milton Friedman helps us 
shape an alternative explanation rooted in understanding changes in the 
institutional mechanisms of the global labor and capital markets.  The 
displacement of the trade union and collective bargaining by globalization has 
pushed organized labor and other groups to look to political intervention in the 
capital markets as an alternative means to establish legitimacy.  This intervention 
should be encouraged to develop new institutions to respond to the growing 
legitimation crisis of global capitalism.  
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Introduction
As one of her last acts as Acting Chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, in the spring of 2001 Laura Unger threw what the Financial Times called a 
“bombshell” into the global capital markets.1  Responding to pressure from Congress and 
an emerging independent political campaign, Chairman Unger issued a letter that 
acknowledged that the human rights violations by issuers of securities can be considered 
“material” to investors and therefore foreign issuers of securities in the United States will 
now be required to provide disclosure of the risks associated with any investments by 
these issuers in countries where the United States has imposed sanctions for human rights 
or other legal violations.2  The Unger Letter followed the unprecedented effort over the 
previous year by a range of labor, religious, human rights, and anti-slavery groups to 
change American securities law in part by attempting to derail the initial public offering 
(“IPO”) of common stock by PetroChina Company Ltd. (“PetroChina”), a large oil 
producing company controlled by the government of the People’s Republic of China 
(“PRC”). 
For decades the U.S. capital markets have been considered relatively free of the 
risk and uncertainty of political interventions that are common in many other 
jurisdictions.  Thus, issuers have been thought to benefit from a lower cost of capital and 
greater transparency and predictability about regulatory action.  Because of these 
1
 Edward Alden, SEC Chief Inherits Disclosure Bombshell, FIN. TIMES, May 11, 2001, at 
1. Note that the SEC continues to use the word “Chairman” despite widespread usage of 
gender-neutral titles in other parts of the government.
2
 Letter from Laura Unger, Acting Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, to 
Frank P. Wolf, Congressman, U.S. House of Representatives (May 8, 2001) (on file with 
author) (hereafter, the “Unger Letter”).
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apparent advantages, it is argued that in recent years a larger number of foreign issuers 
have tapped into the deep and liquid U.S. capital markets by listing their securities on a 
U.S. exchange.  In the words of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan,  “the 
openness and the lack of political pressures with the [American financial] system…has 
made it such an effective component of our economy and indeed has drawn foreigners 
generally to the American markets for financing, as being in many cases the most 
efficient place where they can in many cases raise funds”3  Thus, the Unger Letter on the 
U.S. capital markets represents a significant break with the hands-off tradition in the 
United States.  Indeed, perhaps not surprisingly, its impact was felt almost immediately.  
Soon after the release of the Unger Letter, Lukoil, a large Russian oil company that was 
considered a crown jewel in that country’s privatization and economic reform process, 
announced that it would withdraw a planned listing of its common stock on the New 
York Stock Exchange in order to list its shares instead on the United Kingdom’s London 
Stock Exchange.  In a brief statement, Lukoil said that it wanted to avoid what it called 
the “political risk” now associated with a U.S. listing.4  This followed a decision some 
weeks before by the PRC to withdraw a planned sovereign debt offering in the United 
States.5  These were precisely the kinds of developments that critics of the approach 
3 Hearing on the Federal Reserve’s Report on Monetary Policy Before the Senate 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, July 20, 2000 (statement of Alan 
Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System).
4
 Alison Beard, Russia's Lukoil disappoints US investors with London listing, Fin. Times,
July 2, 2001 at 23.
5
 Joe Leahy and Aline Van Duyn, Spy plane incident hits bond sale in US, Fin. Times, 
May 16, 2001 at 31 (“Recent changes to SEC procedures regarding the amount of 
documentation required from foreign borrowers might also have delayed the process of 
issuing a bond into the US market”). 
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taken by Unger had feared.6
Nonetheless, this reaction to the Unger Letter did not stop those who argued that 
the capital markets are now an appropriate, indeed, crucial arena for advocacy of certain 
political goals.  The AFL-CIO, for example, the 13 million member umbrella body for 
America’s trade union movement that had played a key role in the protests about 
PetroChina’s IPO, followed that effort with a campaign to block the proposed tender 
offer by integrated oil giant Amerada Hess (“AHC”) for the publicly traded shares of the 
exploration and production specialist Triton Oil (“Triton”).7  AHC had a 25% stake in the 
British oil company Premier, one of the last major multinational companies to maintain 
an active investment in Burma, or Myanmar, a country laboring under a brutal military 
dictatorship.8   In addition, Triton has operations in Equatorial Guinea, on the west coast 
of Africa, and in Colombia.  Both countries have severe internal political strife and are 
the locale of concerns about human rights violations.  The AFL-CIO has also been 
conducting an aggressive shareholder campaign to force Unocal, the California oil 
producer, to change its investment policy in Burma in light of accusations that the 
company, among other allegations of human rights violations, engaged military forces 
6
 Greenspan, supra note 3 (“to the extent that we block foreigners from investing or 
raising funds in the United States, we probably undercut the viability of our system”).
7 Union peak body calls for Amerada Hess vote on Triton, Oil & Gas Today, Aug. 8, 
2001. 
8
 In late 2002 AHC and Premier Oil gave into shareholder and public pressure and sold 
off its Burmese assets to a Malaysian company friendlier to the dictatorial regime.  Terry 
Macalister, Premier Oil gets out of Burma, The Guardian, Sept. 17, 2002; Press Release, 
The Burma Campaign UK, Campaigners Celebrate as Premier Oil pulls out of Burma 
(Sept.16, 2002) at http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/pressreleases/160902.html.
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there to use forced labor to help build a natural gas pipeline.9
This unprecedented development in the capital markets, I will argue, can only be 
understood in the context of the broader debate about globalization10 that has emerged 
over the last several years.  A problem is emerging in the global economy that may 
indeed prove to be fatal for Anglo-American capitalism11 as we now know it.  This model 
of capitalism has evolved and survived for some two hundred years or more in significant 
part because of its ability to generate legitimacy, understood as a sense inculcated in the 
9
 Press Release, AFL-CIO, Worker Shareholders Challenge Unocal’s Plans for New 
Investment in Burma And Ask for Commitment to Global Labor Standards (May 20, 
2002) (on file with author).
10
 The concept "globalization" remains controversial and difficult to pinpoint. For the 
purposes of this article I consider globalization to represent the attempt to spread the 
Anglo-American model of capitalism, particularly seen in the expansion of cross-border 
flows of capital in both its fictitious and physical forms (i.e., investment and trade) that 
has been so marked in the last twenty years. In addition to the increase in flows, the 
ability to locate first class production facilities in low cost areas around the globe, a 
process facilitated by financial and technological developments, gives a new significance 
to capital mobility and threatens long-standing social and economic arrangements 
together with the political and institutional frameworks that accompanied those 
arrangements. For a generally favorable view of the impact of globalization, see Thomas 
Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (2000). For 
critical views from the left, see Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (2002), 
Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for World Dominance, 
(1999) and William Greider, One World Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global 
Capitalism, (1998). For a critical assessment from the right, see John Gray, False Dawn: 
The Delusions of Global Capitalism, (1998).  On the WTO protests in Seattle see Stephen 
F. Diamond, Bridging the Divide: An Alternative Approach to International Labor Rights 
after the Battle of Seattle, 29 Pepperdine L. Rev. 115 (2002).
11
 I write of the Anglo-American model in distinction from the European and Asian 
models.  The Anglo-American model, as will be clear from discussion below, relies 
heavily on arms-length capital markets as opposed to friendly creditors as a source of 
capital for, and as a device for the discipline of, corporations.  The core principles (and 
principals!) of this model have become central to the globalization process of the last 
twenty years.  See Michel Albert, Capitalism vs. Capitalism (1993); Ronald Dore, Stock 
Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism – Japan and Germany versus the Anglo-Saxons 
(2000).
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general population that the system is not only the best that can be achieved under the 
circumstances, no matter how unjust or unequal actual social outcomes, but that these 
outcomes are reached in a manner that reflects the needs or desires of a substantial 
majority of the population.12  The ability of capitalism to generate this legitimacy has 
depended crucially on certain compromises crafted with the general population through 
ideology, institutions and mass organizations.  This was true, for example, throughout the 
four decades of the Cold War, for both contending parties.  The bureaucratic regimes of 
the east justified their existence by appealing to the alleged material improvements they 
provided for the bulk of their populations.  This apparent achievement helped those 
regimes generate an attractive ideological agenda that appealed to hundreds of millions of 
desperately poor people around the world and thus posed a serious political challenge to 
the traditional capitalist regimes of the West.  Stalinism made (and in the case of a 
handful of counties like Cuba, China and North Korea, continues to make) this appeal not 
just through the exercise of mindless propaganda but also through the active efforts of 
mass organizations controlled rigidly from above by the government or a Communist 
party.13
12On legitimacy and capitalism generally see Juergen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis 
(1973) at 19 (“[P]rivate ownership of the means of production….in the long run threatens 
social integration [but] within the framework of a legitimate order of authority, the 
opposition of interests can be kept latent and integrated for a  certain period of time.  This 
is the achievement of legitimating world-views or ideologies.”); and Max Weber, 
Economy and Society (1968) at Vol. 1, 213, cited in Habermas at 97 (“Experience shows 
that in no instance does domination voluntarily limit itself to the appeal to material or 
affectual or ideal motives as a basis for its continuance.  In addition every such system 
attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy.”)
13
 For an exploration of the internal political dynamics of the Stalinist and neo-Stalinist 
regimes see Stephen F. Diamond, Class and Power in Revolutionary Nicaragua: The Rise 
and Decline of the Sandinista Movement (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of London) (on file with author).
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A variation of this legitimation process was also found in the west in tripartite and 
corporatist institutions that, for example, brokered wage and productivity deals between 
workers, employers and the government. In the west, of course, the strength of the 
system’s legitimacy was not found largely in arguments about the material conditions of 
the working class, though such arguments were certainly made, but rather in the 
argument that basic civil liberties guaranteed freedom for all its citizens.  The existence 
of process acting as a check on the arbitrary exercise of power through institutions like 
free trade unions and collective bargaining helped western capitalism win the hearts and 
minds of its working class.14
The result, in both east and west, was the widespread social acceptance, at least 
for several decades, of what can be thought of as a social variation of Pareto optimality:
the working class would not revolt no matter how much better off the wealthiest or 
politically connected became as long as the participatory institutions available to the 
working class generated steady improvement in their welfare.15  With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and its subsidiary regimes in Eastern Europe, the Stalinist variation of the 
legitimation process disappeared.  No ideology has emerged which attempts to justify its 
existence on the basis of widespread material improvement of the population.  In fact, to 
the extent that coherent ideologies advertising a general explanation of the world’s ills 
14
 See E.P. Thompson, Whigs & Hunters 265 (1977) (“…the notion of the regulation and 
reconciliation of conflicts through the rule of law – and the elaboration of rules and 
procedures which, on occasion, made some approximate approach towards the ideal –
seems to me a cultural achievement of universal significance.”)
15
 In the west, the general acceptance of this view was signaled by the emergence of the 
“difference principle” arguments of John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971).  This was 
expressed more cynically and with pointed humor in the eastern bloc.  Russian workers in 
the Soviet era were heard to quip:  “They pretend to pay us, we pretend to work.”  See 
Miklos Haraszti, A Worker in a Worker’s State (1977).
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have emerged, such as Islamic fundamentalism or racialist nationalism, they actually aim 
to take the world back to a pre-capitalist if not primitive era.16
While the absence on the world stage of the Stalinist approach has been widely 
remarked upon, particularly in the west during the heady triumphalist period of the 
1990’s, what has been less well understood is the change in the kind of appeal that that 
same western, or Anglo-American, capitalism now makes, whether consciously or not, to 
the billions of the world’s desperate, poor and hungry.  Western capitalism has, in fact, 
also broken with its approach to legitimacy, thus opening up an ideological and 
institutional vacuum in the global economy.  While the Cold War forced both east and 
west to legitimate their respective systems, now that a more aggressively neo-liberal form 
of capitalism has emerged from that period, its advocates no longer feel the same social 
or political pressure to craft the institutions that were once relied upon to generate 
legitimacy.  Thus, in the new global post cold war environment western capital has joined 
hands with a new post communist elite to forge new corporations, markets and, indeed, 
entire countries.  This process is taking place largely from above with less and less 
consideration of its impact on the general population.  At the same time, however, an 
independent response is being crafted from below through new social movements and 
also through variations in activity by those older institutions, such as trade unions, that 
once participated actively, if not always willingly or enthusiastically, in the legitimation 
process of the Cold War era.17   A new kind of global fracture is emerging, not on a 
16
 John Lloyd, Islam’s battle with a hostile world, Fin. Times, Jan. 10, 2003.
17
 In the case of the trade unions this is much more the case in the west where the labor 
movement retained some level of independence from the system throughout the cold 
war.  In the east, the so-called trade unions were merely party appendages unable, for the 
most part, to generate any independent life after the collapse of the regimes.
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geographical basis, not between east and west, as in the Cold War, but on a social basis, 
between those, on the one hand, who control dominant institutions from above and, on 
the other hand, from below by those who are impacted by these institutions.18  This 
fracture signals the emergence of a legitimation deficit created by the globalization 
process.  This phenomenon has been evidenced most visibly by the anti-globalization 
protests against the World Trade Organization seen in Seattle in November 1999.19
To explore this new social fracture and its challenge to the legitimacy of Anglo-
American capitalism, this article presents a case study of the attempt by the Chinese 
18
 This comment signals the existence of a deeper concern in legal and political thought.  
This article is a contribution to a longstanding debate over the nature of law itself.  The 
author belongs to a tradition marked by the work of E.P. Thompson who noted that law is 
not simply “another mask for the rule of a class,” rather law is the outcome of complex 
social conflict:  “What was often at issue [in Thompson’s examination of 18th century 
battles between independent hunters and royal land-owners] was not property, supported 
by law, against no-property; it was alternative definitions of property-rights….”  
Thompson, supra note 14, at 259-61.  In a word, men and women make law, but not just 
as they please.  Thus, an important challenge for legal scholarship in the 21st century is to 
expose the unique social conflicts emerging in a new global environment, a new form of 
what Justice Holmes called “experience,” and examine and debate the appropriate legal 
forms and institutions necessary to resolve those conflicts.  This intellectual challenge is 
similar to the one that confronted legal thought in the late 19th century as the emerging 
era of industrial capitalism posed an new intellectual challenge.  As Justice Holmes wrote 
of his approach to the problem: “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience.”  Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (1991) at 1 (emphasis added).  
See also his dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) where with his 
memorable comment, “[g]eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases,” Holmes 
signaled the emergence of a battle against “Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statistics.”  A 
valuable reprise of Holmes’ thinking, particularly his approach to “experience,” is found 
in Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America 337-347 (2001).  
Thompson, much like Holmes, believed in the importance of reason, noting in the
foreword to one of his most important works:  “I commenced to reason in my thirty-third 
year, and, despite my best efforts, I have never been able to shake the habit off.”  The 
Poverty of Theory and Other Essays (1978).  Both Holmes and Thompson, can “be 
distinguished…from…skeptics, who question[…] the power of legal reasoning of any 
kind.”  Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our "Regulatory Takings' Jurisprudence": 
The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
106 Yale L.J. 613, 644 (1996).
19
 Diamond, supra note 10.  
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government and major Wall Street investment banks to complete an initial public offering 
(“IPO”) by a major Chinese corporation.  Their efforts represented a classic example of 
the effort to build a new global capitalist order from above without significant concern 
for the legitimation question.  And, as we shall see, the effort was met from below with a 
vigorous social response.  Thus, I suggest that a kind of syndrome, the PetroChina 
Syndrome if you will, is emerging that reflects the failure to resolve new conflicts caused 
by the globalization process.
Part I of the article examines the PetroChina IPO itself, explaining the reasons 
why the stock offering occasioned such controversy and demonstrating the unwillingness 
of the Chinese regime, the company and its advisors to consider its associated social and 
political problems.  Part II discusses the unprecedented campaign against the IPO itself so 
that the political forces generating the PetroChina Syndrome are better understood.  Part 
III describes the key features of the resulting Unger Letter.20   Part IV reviews 
conventional explanations and arguments that help, in part, to explain the Unger Letter 
and the PetroChina Campaign, including traditional securities law concerns, a change in 
the political climate represented by the anti-globalization movement and structural 
changes in the global capital markets.  Part V begins the discussion of the emergence of 
the legitimation deficit by exploring the work of economic historian Massimo De 
Angelis.  De Angelis’ innovative reconsideration of the work of two archetypal 
economists of the 20th century, John Maynard Keynes and Milton Friedman, helps us 
20
 The Unger Letter is a hybrid instrument, most similar to the more standardized 
“Interpretive Releases” that the SEC issues regularly.  It combines an interpretation of 
existing rules with a proposal for modification of those rules and also relays to Congress 
a staff memorandum that discusses the Commission’s research and investigation of the 
issues involved.
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come to a deeper understanding of the issues raised by what can be called the PetroChina 
Syndrome.  But I will argue, in Part VI, that this understanding is incomplete without a 
deeper exploration of the role of process in generating legitimacy in the modern industrial 
era.  Without that concern for process the PetroChina Syndrome cannot be correctly 
diagnosed.  The legitimation deficit this Syndrome signals can only be filled by the 
design of new institutions that respond constructively to the problems of the new era.
Part I.  The PetroChina Offering.
In early 2000, an international consortium of investment banks, law firms, 
consulting groups and accounting firms, led by the American investment bank Goldman 
Sachs launched an initial public offering of the common stock of the newly-formed 
mainland Chinese oil company PetroChina Company Limited, popularly known as 
“PetroChina.”21  When plans for the IPO first surfaced, the company and its advisors 
hoped that it would mark the largest ever public offering of stock in a Chinese state 
owned enterprise (“SOE”) and represent a watershed event for pro-free market reform 
elements currently in power in China.  But the transaction also meant potential 
devastation for the workforce of the Chinese oil industry as more than one million 
workers at the restructured company were to be dismissed as “redundant” with only 
minimal social protections and, at best, uncertain prospects for alternative employment.22
21
 See Final Prospectus, PetroChina Company Limited, March 27, 2000 (on file with 
author) (hereafter “PetroChina Prospectus”).
22
 Indeed, the frustrations of the laid off workers boiled over into open protest in the 
Spring of 2002, as part of what one close observor has called a “veritable labor 
insurgency” now underway in the PRC.  Ching Kwan Lee, From the Specter of Mao to 
the Spirit of the Law:  Labor Insurgency in Postsocialist China, Lecture, Center for East 
Asian Studies, Stanford University, November 1, 2001.  Conflict was particularly acute in 
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In accord with longstanding plans, the PetroChina IPO was to be the first of 
several that the Chinese government planned to bring into the global capital markets in 
the following year.  In each case, the workforces of major industrial companies would 
face unemployment as downsizing and restructuring were forced upon them.  These 
transactions were not to be subjected to the widely accepted checks and balances found in 
the developed world.  China remains without the basic democratic institutions that 
investors and the wider public outside of China take for granted.  There are no 
legislatively established, transparent and accountable regulatory agencies to oversee the 
social impact of major economic changes.  There is no independent trade union 
movement or a collective bargaining process to provide some form of representation for 
the tens of millions of workers whose lives are being severely impacted by economic 
reform. 23  In addition, there are no open, efficient and regulated capital markets to 
provide investors and companies with a viable pricing mechanism for their assets.  
Further, investors in the proposed IPO’s were to be sold only minority stakes and serve as 
junior partners of the Chinese state that planned to retain for itself majority control and 
effective influence over the future of these entities.24
the Daqing oilfields now owned by PetroChina.  See Stephen F. Diamond, The Chinese 
Market: An Enigma Unraveled, Dissent, Summer, 2002.  These strikes were widely 
expected yet PetroChina told potential investors that its relationship with its employees 
was “good” and provided no information or background on the potential for worker 
unrest.   PetroChina Prospectus at 143.
23
 Though beyond the scope of this article, it is important to note that while the lack of 
basic civil liberties and trade union rights are extreme in the PRC, a variation on these 
conditions is increasingly the norm in the newly industrializing areas of the so-called 
emerging market countries, thus feeding into the “legitimation deficit” discussed here.
24
 See PetroChina Prospectus at 31.
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This first section explores each of these key areas in greater depth, including the 
new corporate structure at PetroChina, the changing Chinese economic context in which 
the IPO took place, the human rights concerns raised by the offering and an assessment of 
the offering from the standpoint of traditional investor concerns about corporate 
governance. 
A. The New Structure.
PetroChina was formed in November of 1999 as a result of months, perhaps 
years, of planning by the government of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”).25
PetroChina was initially established as a wholly owned subsidiary of its parent company 
– China National Petroleum Corporation (“CNPC”).  CNPC is one of several Chinese 
state-owned oil companies.  The three largest of these are CNPC, the China 
Petrochemical Corporation (“Sinopec”) and the Chinese National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (“CNOOC”).  CNPC and Sinopec divide among themselves the assets of all 
of China’s domestic oil extraction, refining and distribution.  Roughly, CNPC operates in 
northern and western China and Sinopec in the eastern and coastal regions of the 
country.26  Meanwhile, CNOOC, as its name suggests, is responsible for offshore 
production and distribution, including the strategically important oil reserves in the South 
China Sea.27
25
 Many details of the IPO remain confidential to this day.  For example, there were 
reports that the entire restructuring of the oil industry was planned by the Chinese regime 
secretly with the World Bank.  However, the Bank or the PRC of this process has made 
no report or other form of public accounting.
26
 On the restructuring, see PetroChina Prospectus at 73.
27 Id. CNPC and Sinopec do engage in foreign investments to supplement shortfalls in 
domestic oil production.  In particular, CNPC is a joint venture partner in an oil 
production effort underway in the Sudan.  This triggered the opposition of several human 
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PetroChina emerged from within the much larger CNPC as an attempt to create a 
business that could attract foreign capital.  PetroChina is viewed by the Chinese and its 
foreign advisors as holding the “crown jewels” of the assets of CNPC, including the key 
Daqing oil fields and the pipelines that move 84% of China’s natural gas.  It has five 
business units: oil and gas exploration and production, oil refining and petrochemical 
production, oil sales and pipeline operations, foreign joint ventures, and research and 
development.  It controls more than two-thirds of China’s oil and gas production and 
ranks among the world’s largest oil companies.28  It contributes a substantial portion of 
the total profits earned by China’s largest State-Owned Enterprises (“SOE’s”).  
PetroChina took with it from CNPC close to 500,000 of the total 1.5 million workers 
employed by CNPC.  The 1,000,000 who remained were considered largely redundant 
and are now in the process of being dismissed with minimal severance payments.29  With 
government plans to lay-off tens of millions of workers throughout China in the next 
several years as restructuring of other SOE’s moves forward, Chinese oil workers are 
unlikely to find alternative employment easily.  Industry analysts even argue that the 
500,000 workers that will go to work for PetroChina are far more than necessary.  Exxon 
rights and religious groups to the PetroChina IPO.  Peter Wonacott and Ian Johnson, 
PetroChina Hopes to Shake Off Its Past, Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 2000 at A13.  As we will see 
below, the Sudan link is a major factor in the process that led to the Unger Letter.
28
 Mark L. Clifford and Dexter Roberts, Can this Giant Fly: China’s oil company hopes 
for $5 billion from Wall Street, Business Week, Feb. 7, 2000, at 94B.
29
 Wang Xiangwei, PetroChina in pledge to slash costs, South China Morning Post, Jan. 
31, 2000 at 1 (“about one million workers…have been made redundant through the 
restructuring”); Michael Forsythe, Chinese Minister says more must be done to help fired 
workers, Bloomberg News, April 12, 2002 (in 2001 CNPC and Sinopec “fired 600,000 
workers between them”).
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employs only one-fourth as many people.30   The oil industry generally considers China’s 
oil companies to be “grossly overstaffed, even by the bloated standards of other national 
oil companies.”31
A small army consisting of more than 2,000 investment bankers, consultants, 
accountants and lawyers, designed the new PetroChina structure.  The lead manager of 
the IPO was the American investment bank, Goldman, Sachs.  The key co-manager was 
the China International Capital Corp., a joint venture of the PRC’s China Construction 
Bank and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter.  PricewaterhouseCoopers (accounting), 
McKinsey & Co. (consultancy), and seven foreign law firms rounded out the foreign 
team advising the Chinese company.32
The new company attempted to lure several key business leaders in the oil 
industry and elsewhere to serve as outside directors.  Of the three names that surfaced 
during the marketing of the deal, only two accepted:  Chee-chen Tung, the brother of the 
Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and Wu Jinglian, a leading PRC economist and an 
advisor to Premier Zhu Rongji.33  Another senior government economist, Liu Hongru, 
30
 In fact, since the IPO PetroChina has engaged in a series of layoffs despite reported 
profitability and aggressive expansion plans, responding to investor expectations.  See 
Petrochina to invest 2.2 bln yuan in 1,500 petrol stations this yr., AFX Asia, Aug. 29, 
2002 (“The company will continue to lay off employees to further improve operating 
efficiencies”); J.V. Cruz, Jr., Hither and Thither – The Chinese Way, Business World 
(Philippines), Aug. 30, 2002 at 5 (“Exxon Mobil, with revenues almost six times bigger 
than PetroChina's, has about 123,000 employees. PetroChina's employee headcount is 
about 1.4 million. Each employee of Exxon Mobil thus accounts for US$1.5 million of 
revenues, while each employee of PetroChina accounts for US$21,000….PetroChina
seems overstaffed. If it is, it's only because China is trying to minimize the pain of a 
program that has already brought on considerable anguish.”)
31
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who received his academic training at the University of Moscow in 1959, replaced Wu 
Jinglian in late 2002.34  Franco Bernabe, former head of the Italian oil conglomerate ENI, 
initially turned down the opportunity but later became the sole non-Chinese member of 
the Board.35  The two “outside” Chinese directors were likely, in fact, to act as proxies 
for the Beijing regime given their close ties to the government.36  To appear more like 
companies familiar to the international investment community, several Board committees 
were established as well, including an audit committee, a health, safety and 
environmental protection committee, an examination and salary committee, and an 
investment and development committee.37  However, without a competitive market for 
corporate control or an independent judiciary there were no clear guarantees that these 
bodies would operate in anything like their counterparts in developed market economies.
Initially, it was reported that PetroChina hoped to raise as much as US$10 billion 
in the IPO.  This figure was then scaled back several times as bankers ran into severe 
political and financial headwinds.38  When the dust settled, the company was only able to 
raise US$2.9 billion, and much of that was provided at the very last minute by friendly 
Hong Kong investors and BP, the large UK oil company, in side deals negotiated by the 
34
 Liu Hongru, Executive Profiles, PetroChina.com, 
http://www.petrochina.com.cn/english/gsjs/21119.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2002).
35
 Franco Bernabe, Executive Profiles, PetroChina.com, 
http://www.petrochina.com.cn/english/gsjs/1231.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2002).
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37 Id. at 17.
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underwriters. All told, this represented an approximate 10% stake in PetroChina.  
Majority control of PetroChina (the remaining 90% of the common stock) remained in 
the hands of the parent company, CNPC.  In addition, PetroChina put in place a dividend 
distribution policy that obligated the company to share half of its future earnings with its 
parent, CNPC.  One leading oil industry source stated: “CNPC remains in total control of 
the new entity.”39
As state owned enterprises, CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC are controlled, in turn, 
by the government of the People’s Republic and, hence, by the Chinese Communist 
Party.  Corporate officers of the SOE’s are appointed by the government and serve at its 
whim.  In fact, at one point during the IPO process, the Wall Street Journal reported that 
the President of Sinopec, Li Yizhong, had been reassigned to become “governor or the 
communist party secretary” of the Gansu province in northwest China.  Replacing Li at 
Sinopec would be the current President and Chairman of CNPC, Ma Fucai.  Ma Fucai 
had been slated to serve as Chairman of PetroChina and, hence, lead the planned “road 
show” to Hong Kong, London and New York – a crucial corporate step in the effort to 
sell an IPO to major institutional investors. 40  The new President of CNPC, replacing Ma 
Fucai, was to be Yan Sanzhong, a former deputy director of the government agency that 
oversees the oil and petrochemical industry.  He did not have extensive experience, 
however, in the oil extraction operations that are key to PetroChina and he had only been 
a vice president of CNPC for six months.  
39
 Lawrence Basapa, China launches “world class” petro giant, Chemical News & 
Intelligence, Nov. 10, 1999.
40 China’s Petroleum Industry Undergoing Major Management Overhaul – Sources Say,
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This move was very unpopular with potential investors and was eventually 
reversed.   “Analysts doubt if Ma and Yan are qualified for their new positions,” the 
Journal reported.  The Journal concluded, “the managerial overhaul sends a confusing 
signal to the oil industry as it comes just before the two companies launch their initial 
public offerings.”41  The motivation for these changes appeared to be domestic political 
considerations.  They were “seen as part of the government’s strategy to accelerate the 
development of northwestern China.”42
  To impose such a significant change in corporate leadership in the middle of an 
IPO would be considered a disaster in the United States or Europe.  In fact, it would be 
unthinkable because no government diktat could force a company to move its CEO 
around in such a manner.  Although many state owned companies in Western Europe 
have been privatized through IPO’s in the last decade, this kind of move has never been 
made.  It was no surprise that this change was cancelled, but the mere reporting of such a 
possibility made potential investors very nervous about the governance structure in place 
at the new entity.  Evidence of the political connection between the company and the 
regime has continued since the IPO.  In early 2002 PetroChina announced it was 
conducting exploratory discussions with Husky Energy, a Canadian oil company 
controlled by Hong Kong based billionaire Li Ka Shing.  However, when the discussions 
fell apart, the public announcement by PetroChina that it was withdrawing from the 
negotiations was made by the PRC’s State Development Planning Commission vice-
41 Id. As will be discussed below, the PetroChina IPO is the lead project in a planned 
stream of public offerings by Chinese SOE’s.
42 Id.
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minister Zhang Guobao with PetroChina Chairman Ma Fucai sitting silently beside him.43
Commenting on the nature of the announcement a writer in the South China Morning 
Post noted that “[w]hat this PetroChina cameo illustrates is that Beijing has yet to 
recognise the sanctity of  listed private companies….shareholders have to add on a new 
level of risk if politicians, with their different set of priorities, can waltz in and turn things 
upside down.”44  Serving time in the senior management at PetroChina also remains a 
conduit for political power.  Ma Fucai was recently appointed as an alternate member of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party.45  And the former head of PetroChina 
parent CNPC was recently named head of the Ministry of Public Security, which controls 
China’s police forces.  This Ministry has been responsible for the crushing of the Falun 
Gong religious movement in China.46
B. The Chinese Context.
1. Economic Reform.
The PetroChina IPO must be viewed in the context of the dramatic economic 
changes that have been taking place in China for several years.  As far back as the early 
1980’s the Chinese Communist Party began to search for alternative economic forms that 
would allow it to maintain its political control while at the same time improving 
economic growth and worker productivity.  Reaction to the excesses of the Maoist era led 
43
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to the emergence of a concept called “market socialism” where the regime would 
establish a variety of new structures that made room for a private sector and foreign 
investment.  Initially, these were limited to the freeing up of prices for the agricultural 
sector, the encouragement of a small-scale private sector in consumer and light industrial 
goods, and the establishment of Special Economic Zones, particularly in coastal regions. 
The latter were able to take advantage of their proximity to the regional economic 
powerhouses like Japan and the so-called “tigers” of East Asia, including South Korea, 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore.47
Slowly the reform process expanded to the point where the core assets of the 
state-owned economy were to be restructured and privatized.  In theory, the regime’s goal 
is to privatize the great majority of SOE’s.48  Many of these have already carried out a 
form of home grown privatization built around “debt for equity” swaps where a 
company’s workforce is forced to buy shares in their own debt-laden and unproductive 
firms or else face dismissal.  Alternatively, worker pensions funds are expropriated by 
current management and invested as operating capital in the money-losing ventures “so 
workers become ‘share holders’ by default without any say in the management of the 
enterprise and in addition risk losing their share when the company is sold.” 49  Often, 
47
 For an overview of the reform process see Diamond, supra note 10.
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despite their reorganization as joint-stock companies, management remains the same and 
local government officials continue to control the entities.50
This process is linked intimately to efforts to cut costs and slash work forces.  The 
economically active population of China consists of about 890 million people, with some 
600 million in rural areas and 280 million in urban areas.  The state sector employs 
approximately 100 million people and it is thought that as many as one third of these are 
slated for dismissal.  In addition, 100 million rural workers are said to be surplus labor 
and are now being encouraged to move to urban areas despite the dim prospects that 
await them there.  Some 82,000 rural migrants to Beijing, for example, earn their living 
as scavengers of the city’s trash dumps, sharing their workspace with rats and flies.51
The risk that the regime faces in this restructuring effort is the possibility that it 
may spark social turmoil that it cannot control.  Thus, “modernization” of some sort 
becomes crucial, both to provide new jobs and to earn income to provide some minimal 
social safety net.  The open question for Chinese society is the nature of this important 
transition.   The IPO of PetroChina was viewed by the regime as “a propeller for the 
mainland’s painful state-sector restructuring” which Premier Zhu hoped would win the 
“heart and soul” of international investors back to China after the East Asian financial 
50
 Sun,  supra note 48 at 32. Also, “the SOE’s are linked closely with…government 
agencies….The managers of these SOE’s are state cadres….assigned to an SOE to work 
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crisis of 1997-1998.52  In 1999 an attempted IPO by CNOOC, the offshore oil company, 
failed to attract serious investor interest and was shelved.53  Capital markets also reacted 
weakly to an offering of stock in the Beijing Capital International Airport entity.54  These 
events highlight the risks that a privatization and capital market strategy entails for the 
state.  In one view, the attempt to tap foreign capital markets is a way to provide a bridge 
to a new era of renewed growth and economic development.  But this strategy can also be 
viewed as an attempt by a dying bureaucratic regime, one that has outlived its social and 
economic relevance, to preserve its privileges.
Prior to his recent retirement, Premier Zhu was the leader of a faction within the 
Chinese Communist Party that is known as the “Shanghai mafia” or the “Shanghai gang.”
He is a former mayor of Shanghai as was his predecessor, Jiang Zemin.  The last 
Shanghai mayor was said by U.S. businessmen to spend more time in Beijing than in 
Shanghai and was once thought of as a potential successor to Zhu.  Many of the new 
appointees to the top leadership positions in China are considered members of this 
faction.55  Because of its long history as a port and industrial city Shanghai has been the 
52
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center of efforts to develop alternative economic forms in China.  The Shanghai-
headquartered Baoshan Steel Group was slated to become the next IPO for the regime 
once the PetroChina IPO was completed.56   (Though, as we will see below, those plans 
had to be altered once the PetroChina IPO ran into serious trouble.)  
Although the Shanghai gang’s “market socialist” ideology now predominates in 
the Communist Party, Maoist views favoring a strong state still receive a hearing.  Events 
like the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Serbia or the entry of China into the World 
Trade Organization are used by the anti-reform elements to assert their views.57  Thus, 
the leadership must navigate between the so-called “left,” on the one hand, and, on the 
other, elements within the reform groups that want to push reform faster or that have 
personal stakes in the success of their particular industry or party faction.  The decision, 
for example, to make PetroChina the first IPO in the planned pipeline was apparently 
made only after an intense internal battle in the regime.  The other domestic oil entity, 
Sinopec, had hoped to go first, but top executives in PetroChina parent CNPC threatened 
a kind of  “shock therapy” to win the day.  They asserted that they were so in need of 
foreign investment, that without it they would be forced to lay off up to a million workers 
overnight thus threatening the regime with widespread social unrest.  It is no surprise, 
the commanding heights of the central government”).  Five clear Jiang allies in new 
China leadership, AFX European Focus, Nov. 15, 2002.
56
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therefore, to find out that there was speculation that Premier Zhu played a personal role in 
the offering process.58
Behind the PetroChina IPO is the fear of the Chinese state bureaucracy that as 
China opens up to the outside world it risks a collapse of key industries that can no longer 
compete on a global basis.  The choice for the regime can be viewed as a fork in the road 
– with one road leading to Singapore and the other to Moscow.  If the regime gets to 
Singapore it will have established a modern industrial country without major social unrest 
and yet have maintained its authoritarian power over Chinese society.  The road to 
Moscow demonstrates the alternative: the regime could try the imposition of “shock 
therapy” in an effort to “catch up” with the West overnight, but it may face the 
unintended collapse of the older SOE’s which cannot match the superior competitive 
power of foreign capital.  
Clearly, the regime wants to get to Singapore but fears it may wake up and find 
itself in Moscow.  Thus, the modernization of its “crown jewels” in the energy sector 
serves a dual purpose:  provide the increased resources necessary for continued economic 
expansion and defend the ability of its oil industry to compete or, at least, hold its own 
with foreign capital.  PetroChina is optimistic about its ability to lead this effort.  In the 
view of company spokesman Zhang Xin:  “We believe PetroChina has the strength, given 
the wide range of CNPC reforms in recent months to become one of the world’s top 
hydrocarbons majors.” 59   Industry experts, however, think this goal is more than a 
58
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decade away.60  Premier Zhu’s goal was to find a way to build a competitive oil sector 
without using state assets.  He is viewed as the “architect” of the policy of tapping 
international equity markets to find the needed cash.61
2. A Changing Oil Industry.
With economic growth comes an increase in energy use.62  China is no exception.  
China experienced double-digit growth in the early 1990’s and the economy was still 
growing at a pace of 8 to 9 percent at the end of the decade.  Total primary energy use, 
one study indicates, rose from 665 million tons of “oil equivalent” (“mtoe”) in 1990 to 
935 mtoe in 1996.  This figure could double by 2010.  The relative decline in the 
importance of oil to the advanced economies is a process that China is not yet able to 
benefit from.  In fact, the rate of oil use could accelerate as the economy develops –
transportation needs alone could drive this process.  
Inevitably, China has in recent years become an oil importer after decades of 
being able to rely solely on its own land-based and offshore reserves.  Domestically, 
China can rely on proven reserves of some 25 billion barrels – approximately the same as 
the United States, but only half that of Russia or Mexico and far below the reserves of the 
leading OPEC members.  China must now import between 500,000 and 700,000 barrels 
60 Id.
61 PetroChina’s IPO – More to it than meets the eye?, Hart’s Asian Petroleum News, Jan. 
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of oil a day (“b/d”) but this is expected to climb to at least 3.5 million b/d by 2010.  
Imports in 1999 alone jumped 43%.  
China has attempted to secure additional reserves internationally.  To date, its 
efforts consist of various joint venture projects by CNPC in Kazakhstan, Peru, 
Venezuela, and Sudan.  (It is the latter project that is the source of domestic U.S. 
opposition to the PetroChina IPO raised by a number of religious and other groups.63)  
China also has plans to invest in Iraq once the U.N. sanctions are lifted.  Industry experts 
believe, however, that these efforts have a natural limit – unless China can modernize its 
refinery assets it cannot process large amounts of the type of oil available from many of 
these sources.  Its efforts to secure offshore sources of oil in the South China Sea –
through CNOOC – have borne fruit but are now reaching a limit.  Crude oil production 
from offshore sources dropped in 1999 after a five-year plateau in growth rates.  New 
fields are to be brought on line in joint ventures with foreign companies.  But until 
recently, China’s offshore production was largely earmarked for export (mainly to 
Australia) to earn much-needed foreign exchange.  This has changed.  In 2000, for 
example, exports were down 2/3 from the previous year.  The oil is now needed 
domestically to compensate for reduced output driven by cost cutting coupled with 
growing domestic demand.  Thus foreign investors see three major opportunities: reliance 
on high sulfur Middle East oil requires expensive upgrades to China’s refineries; the 
breakup of the domestic oil industry gives foreign capital new opportunities to compete; 
and the pace of economic growth has led to a permanent shift in the source of China’s oil 
supply.  
63
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The planned IPO’s then, led by PetroChina, represent a last ditch attempt to 
protect key state assets from the inevitable onslaught of the global market.  It is thought 
that one of the arguments used by the domestic oil industry managers in discussions with 
the top Beijing leadership rested on what was being called “the last free lunch” – an 
argument which said, in effect, the state owes us this one last favor (support for access to 
capital markets) before the state carries out its intention to join the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”).  Once in the WTO, China will face increasing pressure to open 
up key sectors of the economy to direct competition and greater foreign ownership and 
this could well spell the end of the days of privileged SOE’s.64  “The Chinese oil 
companies have to act now, before it is too late, to improve their efficiencies.”65
A variation on this theme suggests that it is the Government itself, not the oil 
potentates of CNPC, that want to retain control of the oil industry.  Proponents of this 
view point to the desire of the PRC to appear to be competing while retaining actual 
control of the publicly traded firms.  “PetroChina management will not be able to prevent 
the looting of its resources on the instructions of its parent or even the government, which 
many fear may happen if crisis situations, especially of a financial nature, develop 
making dipping into PetroChina’s pockets irresistible.”66  The parent company, CNPC, 
64
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retains majority ownership and is a privileged recipient of earnings distributions.67  In 
turn, the Chinese government retains control of CNPC.  
Thus, it is plausible to suggest that the division of assets between Sinopec and 
CNPC is intended to create a permanent duopoly rather than spark domestic competition.  
“The purpose of the CNPC-Sinopec monopolies was to strengthen resistance to foreign 
petroleum company penetration of the business, which would take place at some non-
negotiable defined stage, after China was admitted to the WTO.”68  This suggests that the 
restructuring strategy devised by the CNPC, the Chinese government, and the Goldman 
Sachs-led team of advisers, in fact, relies on the lack of domestic competition which, 
together with an extended phase-in period of the WTO-forced opening of the energy 
sector, would give the Chinese oil giants “several years to strengthen their fortresses, 
making it very difficult and certainly costly for any foreign firms to take them on in their 
own respective backyards.”69
The key move was to find a way to offer up the best of the assets available 
without the “dead weight” of the aging state monopoly.  This need was reinforced by the 
failure of the CNOOC offering in 1999 and led to the so-called “Plan B”:  PetroChina 
was set up with only the best operational assets of CNPC, very few of the debts, and none 
of the overhead associated with retaining a million redundant workers and their 
67
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families.70  “The fundamental policy being put in place confirms that CNPC and Sinopec 
will put into practice their domestic market muscles aimed at keeping foreign intruders at
arms length.  The use of foreign money, through minority stock sales will continue to be 
pursued, on the theme that ‘their money’ will be sought and used, but control will always 
be in the PRC hands.”71
C. Human Rights.
Just as PetroChina IPO was ready to launch, reports were reaching the West that 
the Chinese regime had undertaken yet another crackdown on alleged affiliates of the 
spiritual movement, the Falun Gong.72    A Hong Kong-based human rights group 
reported that Chinese security forces detained approximately 2,000 members of the 
movement during February of 2000.  The group estimated that 5,000 members had been 
sent to prison labor camps for “re-education” and another 300 sent to jail since the 
crackdown started last year.  This crackdown began to reach even those Chinese who 
might have been thought, in the Chinese context at any rate, to be above the law:  a 
Chinese civil court judge “has been sacked and locked up in a mental asylum” because of 
his refusal to renounce his affiliation with Falun Gong.73  The Washington Post reported 
at about the same time that the judge had been held for three months and “given daily 
70 Id.
71 Id.
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injections of a drug that made him sleepy and muddled.” 74 In addition, an acknowledged 
Falun Gong leader was sentenced to nine years in prison.75
Membership in Falun Gong is illegal in China, though the threat to public safety 
that might justify such a law is unknown to outsiders.  The regime apparently believes 
that any form of independent organization is a threat to its legitimacy and power.  This
untimely crackdown was apparently sparked by a demonstration by Falun Gong members 
on Chinese New Year’s eve, February 4th.  Demonstrators assembled in Tiananmen 
Square in Beijing and attempted to unfurl banners.  One hundred people were arrested 
and the arrests then spread to more than 40 cities throughout China.
This fear of independent activity by the population serves well as a general theme 
for assessing the approach of the PRC to human rights in general and labor rights in 
particular.  Thus, in a statement to senior party figures in early 2000, 76 PRC President 
Jiang Zemin “warned that the Falun Gong sect poses as much of a threat to the 
Communist Party as the Solidarity movement did to the communists in Poland in the 
1980s.”  Of course, to deal with Polish Solidarity, the Polish government imposed martial 
law for a decade, arresting thousands, and setting back the democratic reform process in 
Eastern Europe for years.  Jiang suggested that the sect members, together with 
unemployed farmers and workers and “splittists” among various ethnic minority groups 
are the “most destabilizing factors in society.”  Jiang expressed concern that “the jobless 
74 China Using Asylums to Suppress – Banned Movement’s Followers Reportedly 
Institutionalized, The Washington Post, Feb. 12, 2000 at A17.
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in rural and urban areas might ‘join hands’ to pose a challenge to the leadership.”  As a 
report by the International Union of Foodworkers put it in a 1997 report following a 
research mission to Hong Kong:  “There is no dispute about the nature of the regime in 
China: it is a one-party state where the CPC bureaucracy constitutes a ruling class 
exercising a monopoly of power enforced by extensive police control and by the 
repression of dissident opinion and activity.”77
The Falun Gong crackdown is only the latest example of the approach that the 
Chinese Communist regime has long taken to basic civil liberties and human rights.  Here 
is how Amnesty International summarized the human rights picture in China at the end of 
1999 on the eve of the PetroChina IPO:
Hundreds, possibly thousands, of activists and suspected opponents of the 
government were detained during the year.  Thousands of political 
prisoners jailed in previous years remained imprisoned, many of them 
prisoners of conscience.  Some of them had been sentenced after unfair 
trials, others were still held without charge or trial.  Political trials 
continued to fall short of international fair trial standards.  Torture and ill 
treatment remained endemic, in some cases resulting in death.  The death 
penalty continued to be used extensively.78
Despite suggestions by some that limited reform is leading China to the “rule of 
law,” it is very clear that the country remains under the arbitrary “rule of men.”  China 
signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in October of 1999 and 
allowed the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, to visit the 
country, but, according to Amnesty International (“Amnesty”), “repression of dissent 
77 IUF Mission Report at 17. 
78 AI Report 1999: China, Amnesty International, 1999 (hereafter AI Report 1999).
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continued, culminat[ed] in December in the trial of high profile dissidents” and the 
introduction of new regulations controlling “social groups” and publishing.  Amnesty 
concluded that these were signs of  “increasing restrictions on freedom of expression and 
association.”79
Those minimal legal protections that do exist are often abused.  “Political trials 
continued to fall far short of international fair trial standards, with verdicts and sentences 
usually decided by the authorities before trial, and appeal hearings usually a formality.”  
Amnesty reports that a series of trials of pro-democracy activists took place in several 
provinces where defendants were not provided adequate time or resources to mount an 
effective defense.  One veteran pro-democracy activist and bookseller from Qingdao in 
the Shenzung province, Chen Zengxiang, was “reportedly tried in secret in October 
[1999] and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for ‘seeking to subvert the State 
power.’”  He had been held in jail without access to a lawyer since May of 1999.80
One legal scholar who attempted to put an optimistic face on recent legal reforms 
in China nonetheless admitted, “re-education through labor continues to be imposed on 
dissidents.”  He noted that this penalty could be used to incarcerate individuals without a 
charge or trial.  He describes several instances of torture of those held in the re-education 
camps.81  The PRC Ministry of Justice itself admits that 200,000 people are living in 
prison labor camps.  The Laogai system forces prisoners “to plant, harvest, engineer, 
manufacture and process all types of products for sale in the domestic and international 
79 Id.
80 Id.
81
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markets.”  Ironically, perhaps tragically, Dun & Bradstreet actually publishes statistics 
that assess the output of these prisons.  In a 1998 report they indicated that 99 of these 
camps produced more than $800 million in revenue for the state.  The camp list included 
the Nanbao Salt Works where famed Chinese dissidents Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan 
were once held.82  Here is how Wei described Nanbao:  “At Nanbao, political criminals, 
and other criminals, labor as slaves – with no income, no job safety – and make this 
enterprise one of the largest salt chemical factories in Asia.  Every year, millions of yuan 
in profit from this industry contribute to the Chinese government’s efforts to oppress its 
own people.”83  The Dun & Bradstreet report includes a wide range of industrial 
companies encompassing cement, rubber, machine tools, motorcycle engines, aluminum 
products, diesel engines, a paper mill, a fertilizer factory, and a silk plant.
Given China’s continued abuse of the civil liberties and human rights of its 
general population, it should come as no surprise that it brutally suppresses any effort to 
establish a free trade union movement and the labor rights that are generally associated 
with such a movement.  Independent trade unions are outlawed in China.  The right to 
strike is forbidden.  An effort to establish an Autonomous Workers Federation as part of 
the wider Democracy Movement of 1989 was met with particularly harsh repression.  
Many affiliates of that Federation are still in prison or labor camps.  Amnesty details 
82
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numerous ongoing abuses of workers for their organizing and other activity.84  Arrests 
and arbitrary detentions were made throughout 1999 as labor unrest increased due to the 
worsening economic situation.  Here are some of the examples they report:
Li Qingxi, a laid-off worker from the Datong coalmine in Shanxi 
province, was arrested in January when he posted publicly a statement 
calling for independent trade unions.  He was sentenced in March without 
charge or trial to one year of “re-education through labor, reportedly to be 
served “at home.”  Zhang Shanuang, a labor rights activist from Hunan 
province, was detained in July after trying to set up a group to help laid-
off workers.  He was sentenced in December to 10 years’ imprisonment, 
accused of having “illegally provided information to overseas hostile 
organizations and individuals,” reportedly for speaking about farmers’ 
protests in his province in a Radio Free Asia interview.85
The widely respected China Labour Bulletin, based in Hong Kong, confirms that 
the process of “economic restructuring has led to huge pressures on the Chinese labour 
market….many workers laid off from SOE’s have expressed dissatisfaction with the long 
working hours, short-term contracts and miserly benefits that more than not await them in 
the private sector.”86 Linked to this dissatisfaction is a rise in labor disputes, despite the 
frightening risk that such voicing of grievances to official bodies entails.  Even the state-
controlled Labor Disputes and Arbitration Committees, however, reported a 58% increase 
in cases heard in the first six months of 1999.  Of course, the vast majority of such 
disputes are reported only as “solved” with few details available on the facts.  There are 
84
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serious procedural obstacles to bringing these disputes to these dispute resolution bodies, 
so it is unknown how many on the job grievances go unreported.87  In fact, the worst 
fears of critics of the PetroChina IPO and restructuring process came true in the spring of 
2002 when massive demonstrations by laid off workers took place in the Daqing oilfields 
owned by CNPC and PetroChina.88  These were soon followed by large protests by 
unemployed workers in several parts of China, including an unusual demonstration by 
workers in Beijing itself.  Arrests of protest leaders, two of whom were charged with 
“sedition” and thus are now facing the death penalty in a secret trial, were paired with 
modest economic concessions by the regime thus ending this particular wave of unrest.89
However, one sociologist calls these demonstrations evidence of a “veritable labor 
insurgency” underway in China.90
All of China’s industrial workers are members of the only “trade union” body 
allowed to exist – the All- China Federation of Trade Unions (“ACFTU”).  The ACFTU is 
a constituent body of the Chinese State and thus is controlled by Communist Party cadre.  
As in the former Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites, this is a “trade union” 
in name only.  It is, in fact, in the Chinese regime’s own words, “a mass organization of 
the working class” and it serves as a transmission belt for the party and state leadership. 
The Communist Party appoints all of its officials.  As the ACFTU itself stated in 1990:  
87
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“the administration of union cadres by the Party is an unchangeable principle.  The 
ACFTU should work together with the Organization Department of the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in laying down regulations concerning cadre 
management and in monitoring the nomination, investigation, election, approval and 
allocation of union leaders.”  The same document goes on to state that 
trade unions must resolutely oppose any organization or individual 
expressing political views countering those of the Party…On discovering 
the formation of workers’ organizations which oppose the Four Cardinal 
Principles91 and endanger the national regime, the trade union must 
immediately report to same-level party committees and senior-level 
unions, and must resolutely expose and dissolve them.  When necessary, 
the union should demand the dissolution of such organizations by the 
government in accordance with the law.  Concerning organizations 
initiated by workers out of their specific economic interests, the union 
should advise them to dissolve and terminate their activities through 
persuasion and counseling.92
Thus, the ACFTU serves as the “eyes and ears” of the state inside every 
workplace.  Far from supporting democratic and free trade unionism, the ACFTU’s 
central purpose is to carry out State and Party directives and to do everything it can to 
insure that all workers fall into line as well.  It is no surprise to find out, therefore, that 
the ACFTU is viewed by the state as a vehicle for encouraging worker support for the 
very economic reform process that is devastating the social conditions of tens of millions 
of workers.  Those who do not conform to the new economic order are subject to ACFTU 
91
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“mobilizations.”   The Chinese political police (Public Security Bureau or “PSB”) have 
issued “guidelines” that state that “the union[s] must … co-ordinate with the PSB, 
organize ‘public order and prevention teams’ to protect the internal security and order of 
the enterprises, as well as social order.  Staff and workers should be mobilized to struggle 
against all forms of criminal and illegal behavior.  The union must also assist the relevant 
authorities to deal adequately with the education and employment of dismissed 
employees, workers who have committed errors and those have completed sentences and 
been released.”93  This kind of directive can only be characterized as “chilling.”
In addition to the dramatic human rights picture and the suppression of basic trade 
union freedoms, the general situation of workers present particular problems.  
Unemployment and forced migration have already been mentioned.  Further problems 
include the widespread use of underemployment, short-term work, and contract labor, the 
continued control of labor mobility by the State and massive violations of basic health 
and safety precautions.   Official statistics report nearly seven million unemployed urban 
workers, but the China Labour Bulletin estimates that the total is closer to 21 million.94
And even official statistics admit to 30 million “more than needed” workers in the urban 
areas.  These are now supplemented by some 80 to 100 million “floating people” who 
have left their villages looking for work in other areas of the country.95
93 Id.
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Despite the need for a massive shift in employment to new entities, the State fears 
that uncontrolled mobility could open the door to organized opposition to the regime.  
Thus, it has largely kept in place a decades-old system of labor registration – the hukou
system.96 Under hukou every Chinese citizen is required to “have a registration with the 
hukou authority or hukou police at birth.”  In theory no Chinese may work or live outside 
of the area where they were registered at birth.  To accommodate some economic 
pressures, the regime has instituted a system for providing workers with temporary 
residence permits.  Punishment of both employers and employees is meted out if workers 
are hired without a permit.
The PetroChina IPO emerged within this matrix of workforce issues.  It was seen 
by the regime as part of a longer-range plan of the State to dismiss the one million or so 
workers of CNPC considered redundant.  The precise plans were and remain unclear.  
The sketchy offering documents provided to investors indicated that the new entity would 
send a portion of the proceeds from the IPO up to the parent CNPC to make severance 
payments to the laid off workers.97  Severance varies from region to region in China, but 
was expected to be one year’s average salary, or $1200 per worker.  PetroChina and 
CNPC tried to reassure investors that these obligations would not absorb the lion’s share 
of the new entity’s profits, but doubts persisted.98  Further, any such reassurances meant 
96 Id. at 178.
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appearing to leave the problem of severance unsolved.  In fact, the Daqing protests in 
2002 were in reaction to an attempt to cut back on the severance package awarded to 
dismissed CNPC and PetroChina workers.99  Since collective bargaining does not exist in 
China, the CNPC workforce has had no voice in any of the discussions about these issues 
now underway among CNPC executives, State and Communist Party representatives, and 
the legions of foreign investment bankers, lawyers, accountants and consultants.  Thus, 
foreign investors – many of them institutions like pension funds, university endowments 
and mutual funds that now are at the core of global capital markets – were being asked to 
participate in a large socio-economic experiment masked as just another IPO.  It was this 
unusual situation that would help give rise to the unprecedented PetroChina Campaign.
D.  Corporate Governance.
As is widely understood among the fund managers responsible for the assets of
large institutional investors, the concept of  “fiduciary duty” must guide all investment 
decisions.  This is a judicially created doctrine that obligates the fiduciary “to act for 
someone else’s benefit, while subordinating one’s personal interests to that of the other 
person.”100  It is considered the “highest standard of duty implied by law.”101  In the 
memorable words of Justice Cardozo:
99
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Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting 
at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is 
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty 
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard 
of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending 
and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of 
equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 
"disintegrating erosion" of particular exceptions….Only thus has the level 
of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by 
the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this 
court.102
In a financial context, such a duty requires the fiduciary to manage the assets under his or 
her control as a prudent person would manage his or her own property.  In the context of 
a decision to purchase equity in an unprecedented structure and in a foreign country that 
has little or no experience with private enterprise and capital markets, it can only be 
considered prudent for an investment manager or trustee to consider a wide range of 
issues that in an American or European context can be taken for granted.  Whereas in the 
United States, for example, it is at least plausible to rely on the price and volatility of the 
stock markets to provide investors with sufficient information to make investment 
decisions, this was simply impossible in the case of the PetroChina offering.103
102 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (N.Y. Ct. App., Dec. 31, 1928).
103
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The PetroChina IPO raised a wide range of additional concerns.  These included 
the risks associated with the outmoded physical assets of the Chinese oil industry, the 
potential for continuing state interference in the new entity’s management, the influence 
of the regime’s broader policy concerns on the future direction of the entity, and the 
human rights and labor rights concerns that massive layoffs raise.  However, an 
additional set of issues that are traditional areas of interest for investment managers were 
of particular concern in the offering.  These formed the backdrop for the eventual success 
of the campaign against the IPO.  In turn, these issues, together with the labor and human 
rights concerns, have become a significant part of the content of changes to the capital 
markets that are being raised in a variety of settings in the wake of the campaign, 
including the issuing of the Unger Letter.104   These fiduciary-related questions, all of 
which are the subject of disclosure requirements under U.S. securities laws, included 
concerns about the size and price of the offering, the use of proceeds from the offering, 
the potential inability of the new entity to compete in a global market, the lack of modern 
forms of corporate governance in China, the absence of a market for corporate control to 
enforce discipline on management and several other risk factors.
1.  The size and price of the deal.
Throughout the offering process the deal team appeared to be uncertain about its 
direction.  Early reports indicated that PetroChina would sell as much as $10 billion 
Beyond Greed and Fear: Understanding Behavioral Finance and the Psychology of 
Investing (2002).
104
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worth of common stock.105  That was then scaled back to as little as $5 billion in some 
reports, though the consensus figure was thought to be about $7 billion.  This was then 
publicly scaled back by the deal team to $5 billion – with a suggestion that that had been 
their goal all along.  However, when the $10 billion amount surfaced in the business 
press, the team made no apparent effort to dissuade investors that that was their goal.  As 
indicated, the final amount was scaled back again to the end result of $2.9 billion.  Only a 
last minute injection of cash from BP106 and several Beijing friendly Hong Kong 
financiers saved the offering.107
Deal size often fluctuates prior to the pricing of a deal, but rarely in such large 
volumes.  In addition, the fluctuations appeared to reflect great uncertainty about the 
potential success of the offering in light of the failure of the October 1999 effort by 
CNOOC and the weakness of the Beijing Airport offering.  This offering was part of a 
larger plan to bring through several addition deals in the oil sector and other major 
industrial sectors.  All told, China had probably hoped to raise almost US$20 billion in 
the year following this IPO.  Even at US$7 billion there was some doubt that the capital 
markets would be willing to absorb the issue.  “The issue size is so big that the market 
may not be able to absorb it under the current lackluster sentiment,” one Hong Kong 
105
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based fund manager stated.108  In addition to cutting back on the deal size, the 
underwriters aimed for a conservative price of 5.5 times 1999 EBITDA109, below the 7.5x 
multiple that contributed to the CNOOC disaster.  But this priced PetroChina well below 
the 8-10x generally found in the oil industry.  Thus, the Wall Street Journal concluded, 
“[i]nvestors are likely to get their low price because reformers believe that the listing 
must succeed.  But as an executive close to the company says: ‘It’s a story that takes 
some explanation.’”110  Once again, the larger political context of the offering is crucial 
to understanding its dynamic.
2. The use of proceeds from the offering.  
There was serious dispute about the proposed use of proceeds.  The public 
controversy centered on the investment by CNPC in an oil exploration venture in the 
Sudan.  Feeling the political heat, PetroChina and its underwriter Goldman Sachs altered 
the text of its first draft of the preliminary prospectus and alleged in an amendment that 
the Sudan project would stay at the parent level and not be managed by PetroChina.111
Potential investors also expressed concern about suggestions that PetroChina had agreed 
to dividend earnings up to CNPC for the retirement of corporate debt and to make 
severance payments to laid-off workers.  Such payments would eat up half the proceeds 
108
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of the offering, leaving investors wondering what they were really buying: social 
protection for the threatened management of an obsolete company or the shining “crown 
jewels” of a new global player in the energy business?  The remaining proceeds were not 
felt to be “enough to invest in exploration or infrastructure projects, let alone expanding 
its petrochemical and retail network of petrol stations….‘What CNPC is saying is: “We 
are big and we are lousy but we will get better with your money,”’ said one banker. ‘That 
is not the way to enter the international markets.  Investors are not a bunch of 
simpletons.’”112
3. Competitiveness of the new entity.
It is unclear whether or not PetroChina would be a profitable firm if it were truly 
to stand on its own and compete with foreign oil companies.  CNPC remained the 
beneficiary of substantial government protection.  Much of the Chinese oil sector 
receives price protection on the domestic market and benefits from restrictions on 
imported product.  The Financial Times reported that CNPC “must persuade investors 
that it can compete in the absence of government protection.  Its profits…have been 
virtually guaranteed by the state.”113  When this concern was placed next to the issue of 
repaying CNPC’s remaining indebtedness, approximately US$14 billion at the time the 
offering was announced,114 investors clearly had reason to worry about where their 
money would be going.  PetroChina would take over the key productive assets of CNPC 
112
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and the parent was to be left with one million redundant workers.  How would those 
debts be repaid and the pension obligations for the redundant workers be met?  The need 
to fend off social unrest with a severance package is apparently the motivation behind a 
requirement that half of PetroChina’s earnings be earmarked as dividends for CNPC.  Yet 
this has clearly not worked.115  Since CNPC remains in control of 85% of the company’s 
stock, enforcing that requirement will not be a problem – but any expectation that outside 
shareholders will share equally in the rewards is called into question.
4. Parent and Party Control.  
CNPC, of course, controls both the board of directors and shareholders’ meetings.  
Some smaller CNPC subsidiaries have had shares listed in Hong Kong in the past and in 
no instance have outside shareholders been given any management or board-level role in 
the company.  This past history led one oil industry analysis to suggest that “by offering 
corporate shares without allowing any participation in the corporate management, the 
Chinese state oil companies will have to prove to the potential foreign investors that their 
business operations are competitive, transparent and well-managed.”116  Of course, it 
should also be asked precisely how an investor is to exercise “shareholder democracy” –
which lies at the heart of capitalism’s investment philosophy – in a country where the 
most basic democratic rights are violated on a daily basis.  Will shareholders be free to 
speak at shareholder meetings?  Will they be granted rights to assemble, free speech and 
the presentation of grievances to management that are denied PetroChina’s own workers?  
For that matter, can the new management team at PetroChina – to be compensated via an 
115
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unprecedented incentive scheme tied to company performance117 – be counted on to 
speak freely about the company’s problems?  
Chinese law makes it illegal for the shares held directly by the state or state 
owned enterprises in an SOE to be traded on a secondary market.118  Thus mergers and 
acquisitions are practically impossible.  PetroChina management will be free of one of 
the basic sources of competitive pressure on the modern corporation: the fear that poor 
performance will result in the sale of the company and the dismissal of current 
management.  In the words of one observer, “even after converting a state enterprise into a 
joint stock company under the Company Law and publicly offering its stocks for trading 
under the securities laws, the pressure on the state enterprise's manager to perform well 
remains minimal. The state still maintains effective public ownership, and private 
investors have very limited influence on management.”119   As noted above, all top 
Company officers are cadre of the Chinese Communist Party and thus never face the 
prospect of real unemployment.  
While share offerings by Chinese companies are the exception, some prior 
experience is available.  A review of the risks that these companies face, taken from their 
filings with the SEC, indicate the following common concerns: the value of China’s 
currency, the renminbi, is subject to change based on government policy and should be 
117
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considered potentially volatile; the Chinese government controls the convertibility of the 
renminbi into foreign exchange and this could be used to hinder payouts to shareholders; 
PetroChina may not be able to secure sufficient foreign exchange to carry out its 
restructuring; China’s legal system is not complete and enforcement of existing laws or 
contracts based on existing law may be uncertain and sporadic and it may be difficult to 
obtain timely and equitable enforcement of those contracts and laws.120  All of these 
issues have a common root: the continued role of an undemocratic regime in its nation’s 
core economic entities.  These would all fuel the concerns that led to the PetroChina 
Campaign.
Part II.  The PetroChina Campaign.
As word of the proposed initial public offering of PetroChina began to spread, a 
loosely formed coalition of groups emerged to oppose it.  This was an exceptional event 
in the capital markets.  Boycotts of economic activity have been used by political groups 
for many years, most notably the divestment campaign aimed at breaking the apartheid 
regime of South Africa.121  Opposition to a particular offering by a specific company, 
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however, was then and remains exceptional.122  In the end, though, it was the structure 
and then the success of this coalition that was the true exception.  And it was this 
exceptional quality, I will argue below, that signaled the larger political, social and legal 
significance of the Campaign.  
Opposition emerged, initially, from anti-slavery, religious and conservative 
national security groups who focused on the operations of CNPC, in the oil rich African 
nation of Sudan.  The Sudanese-based Greater Nile Oil Project, a joint venture in which 
CNPC held a minority position, was accused of human rights violations including the use 
of forced labor.123  In fact, the Chinese had intended originally to bring CNPC itself 
visited Sept. 1, 2002).  Such an effort may have more traction in a post September 11th
world.
122
 Claims that corporations violate an array of human rights appear to be on the rise.  
Notable examples include the ongoing litigation against the Unocal Corporation for its 
role in Burma and the recently settled claims of WWII Holocaust victims against Swiss 
banks.  See John Doe I v. Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002).  
See, generally, Terry Collingsworth, ILRF Cases to Enforce Labor, Human Rights Under 
Alien Tort Claims Act, Worker Rights News, Vol. 5 No. 1, Spring 2002 at 3 (available at 
http://www.laborrights.org, last viewed Sept. 1, 2002); and Beth Stephens, The Amorality 
of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 20 Berkeley J. Intl. L. 45 
(2002) (“Morally defensible or not, business as usual or not, if corporations are complicit 
in human rights violations, the victims of the abuses have a legal right to compensation 
from those corporations.”); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange 
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197 (1999); Note, 
Should the SEC Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure Requirements?, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1433 
(2002).
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 CNPC’s partners included Talisman Energy Inc., a Canadian concern that faced 
similar political pressure.  In late 2002, in another sign of the significance of the new 
movement sparked by the PetroChina campaign, Talisman announced the planned sale of 
its stake in the Sudan.  Talisman CEO Jim Bucklee expressly acknowledged the impact 
of the protests over the human rights abuses when he announced his company’s exit from 
the region:  “Talisman shares have continued to be discounted based on perceived 
political risk in- country and in North America to a degree that was unacceptable for 12% 
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monitor and analyze events relating to Sudan.”  Press Release, Talisman Energy Inc., 
Talisman to Sell Sudan Assets for C$1.2 Billion (Oct. 30, 2002).  The sale was finally 
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public directly but backed off when it realized that the parent company’s role in the 
Sudan would trigger political opposition.  The decision was then made to set up 
PetroChina as a subsidiary of CNPC, leaving the Sudanese operations at the parent level.  
In its prospectus prepared for investors with the assistance of Goldman Sachs, PetroChina 
explained that it received “most of the assets, liabilities and interests of CNPC relating to 
its domestic exploration and production, refining and marketing, chemicals and natural 
gas businesses,” while “CNPC retained…assets and liabilities relating to international
crude oil and natural gas exploration and production and refining and pipeline 
operations.”124  In addition, the company pledged to “establish separate accounts” from 
CNPC “into which our respective proceeds” from the IPO would be deposited.  CNPC 
asserted that it would not use any of its income from the sale of its shares in the IPO for 
its Sudanese joint venture.125
Nonetheless, this structural arrangement, known in financial circles, perhaps 
regrettably, as a “Chinese Wall,” was insufficient to quell these early critics.  A largely, 
though not exclusively, conservative group of some 200 people led by former Republican 
Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon and former Nicaraguan contra backer and 
Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams signed an open letter to President Clinton on 
completed only in March of 2003 when Talisman announced at the signing ceremony of 
the sale to a state-owned Indian company that it was done “under US pressures.”  Agence 
France Presse, Talisman transfers Sudan stake to Indian company "under US pressure," 
Mar. 9, 2003.
124
 Registration Statement No. 333-11566 on Form F-1, Amendment No. 2, of PetroChina 
Company Limited, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, 
D.C., March 8, 2000, at 3 (emphasis added).
125 Id. at 132-3.
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December 9, 1999, soon after the first draft of the PetroChina registration statement had 
been filed with the SEC.  They argued that:
CNPC and its investment banker, Goldman, Sachs, will shortly seek to 
avoid the Executive Order126 [blocking U.S. funds from the Sudan] and 
public censure by a “restructuring” scheme purporting to withhold IPO 
funds from CNPC’s commitments in Sudan, Iraq and other terrorist states.  
The fungibility of money and the scale of CNPC’s activities in Sudan 
thoroughly undermine the credibility of the contrivance.  No such 
arrangement would have been permitted to evade America’s successful 
assault on South African apartheid, it must not be permitted to do so in the 
service of Sudanese genocide.127
These objections began to register politically.  President Clinton’s Treasury Department 
expanded the list of prohibited companies in the Sudan to include the Greater Nile Oil 
Project.128  A group of largely conservative religious leaders sent a similar letter to large 
institutional investors, including major pension funds.129
Nonetheless, PetroChina and Goldman, Sachs continued to plunge ahead with 
their preparations for the offering.  An upbeat account of the proposed new offering 
appeared in Business Week in late January 2000, with only scant reference to the 
126
 In late 1997, President Clinton invoked his emergency economic powers to impose 
sanctions on the Government of Sudan.  Exec. Order No. 13,067, 62 FR 59,989 (Nov. 3, 
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127
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visited Dec. 16, 2002).
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129
 Letter to James Burton, CEO of CalPERS, dated Jan. 24, 2000 (available at 
http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=00-C_09at, last 
visited Dec. 16, 2002).
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Sudanese connection.130 Even this was swatted away with nary a second thought by 
Goldman’s leading international spokesman, Robert Hormats: Sudan is “not an issue 
because of the extraordinary steps the company is taking to ensure IPO proceeds are only 
used domestically,” he argued.131  At this point it was not clear that the emerging 
PetroChina coalition would have the weight to stop the offering.  The largest and most 
politically sensitive pension funds, the giant college teacher based TIAA-Cref and the 
California Public Employees Retirement System (“CalPERS”), together managing more 
than $400 billion in assets, refused to commit one way or the other.132
At this point, the new coalition received an exceptional boost.  The AFL-CIO 
publicly announced its opposition to the IPO with the publication of a detailed report 
echoing the concerns of the religious, human rights and anti-slavery groups but also 
discussing the kinds of corporate governance, legal and labor concerns described in Part I 
of this article.133  Pointedly, the AFL-CIO report ignored the national security concerns 
raised by the conservative elements in the informal coalition.  The labor federation held a 
conference call with Wall Street investment managers to announce the release of the 
report and it was widely reported in the financial press.134  The federation’s new Office of 
130
 Clifford and Roberts, supra note 28 (the PetroChina offering “will provide an 
important blueprint for overhauling state enterprises….[that] could mark the emergence 
of China’s new corporate giants on the world scene”).
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Investment, headed by experienced shareholder and labor activist William Patterson, 
began a systematic effort to discuss the problems with the offering with fund managers 
and pension fund trustees. 
The AFL-CIO was able to bring considerable weight to the discussions.  The 
labor federation has 13 million members in the United States.  Labor union trustees sit on 
the boards of union sponsored pension funds that manage approximately $400 billion in 
financial assets.  They also sit on the boards of major public pension funds that manage 
an addition $1 trillion in assets.  These funds, in turn, hire fund managers that were part 
of the same investment banks conducting the PetroChina IPO and planning several other 
Chinese IPO’s.   With tens of millions of dollars of fees at stake, there was little doubt 
that Wall Street would be forced to listen to this new voice in the capital markets.  Within 
a few days of the AFL-CIO intervention, both TIAA-Cref and CalPERS announced their 
intention not to purchase shares in the IPO.135  Over the next several weeks the Campaign 
snowballed as more funds agreed not to purchase shares in the offering. 
Some on Wall Street seemed to get the message.  Mark Melcher, a leading analyst 
at Prudential Securities, and his colleague Stephen Soukup, issued a report assessing the 
impact of the Campaign.  Responding to some who called the IPO’s opponents 
“economic Luddites” who would have a “temporary” impact, they said that such a view 
was “dead wrong…this is, as the song goes, the start of something big….[W]hen the dust 
settles on this dispute, the gurus of international investment banking will find that their 
the offering”); James Cox, AFL-CIO flexes muscle against China IPO, USA Today, Mar. 
10-12, 2000.
135
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jobs have been made permanently more difficult by the appearance of a new social 
investment category that has been declared taboo by some of their largest customers, and 
by the addition of a new and highly complicated variable to their already crowded due-
diligence agendas.”136
The high point of this campaign, or perhaps the low point from the perspective of 
PetroChina and Goldman Sachs, was a near physical confrontation between the bankers 
and their oil company clients, on the one hand, and, on the other, the protestors at the St. 
Regis Hotel in New York City in late March 2000.  As part of its “road show,” a standard 
means of bringing company executives together with potential investors in advance of a 
securities offering, Goldman had scheduled a luncheon at the hotel for potential investors 
in the IPO.  The AFL-CIO scheduled what it called a “counter road show” in the same 
hotel.  Richard Trumka, the number two leader of the labor federation and a former head 
of the United Mine Workers union, led the union delegation.  They brought with them a 
Tibetan monk to talk about the oil company’s impact in Tibet and Harry Wu, the well-
known survivor of China’s prison labor camps known as the Laogai.  The morning of the 
road show Goldman Sachs decided to avoid the confrontation and cancelled their 
luncheon at the St. Regis, setting up shop instead a few blocks away at the Four 
Seasons.137  The labor-led force, meanwhile, held their now very visible press conference 
at the St. Regis.
136
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A week after the near confrontation in New York, a Congressional group 
including Republican Spencer Bachus, Democrat Dennis Kucinich and Socialist Bernard 
Sanders, addressed a letter to President Clinton echoing the Campaign’s concern that the 
company would use proceeds from the IPO to support environmentally damaging 
projects in Tibet and the joint venture in Sudan.138     These events took their toll.  The 
company and its bankers were forced to rethink the deal.  The launch date was pushed 
back and, as reports of investor disinterest or opposition came in, they scaled back the 
size of the offering, from an initial goal of raising $10 billion to the final figure of $2.9 
billion.139
Part III.  The Unger Letter.
The impact of the Campaign, however, did not stop with the actual IPO.
PetroChina’s stock price sank below the stated offering price upon its debut and took 
months to recover.140  A headline in The New York Times said it all:  “China’s No. 1 Oil 
Company Goes Public With Whimper:  Protest led by A.F.L.-C.I.O. Takes a Toll.”141
The Chinese government absorbed their experience with this flagship offering and 
announced it would be delaying or shelving altogether the planned offering of several 
138
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other industrial companies.142  Meanwhile the emboldened participants in the PetroChina 
Campaign turned their attention to potential regulatory and institutional reform.           
Responding to complaints from fund managers at major investment banks, the 
AFL-CIO began an effort to establish investment screens at the pension funds on whose 
boards they sat.143  The fund managers claimed they had been “blindsided” by the 
Campaign and, fearing the loss of management fees, said they would be happy to 
implement the approach of the Campaign if given clear guidance by pension fund 
trustees.  The most significant and successful effort came at CalPERS, the giant public 
employee retirement fund for California state employees.  After months of research and 
lobbying, the labor trustees on the CalPERS board, joined by sympathetic public officials 
such as Phil Angelides, California’s state treasurer, and Willie Brown, San Francisco 
mayor and a gubernatorial appointee to the board, proposed and won the adoption of a 
new policy governing the fund’s equity investments in the so-called “emerging market” 
countries, including China.
The new CalPERS policy required the $130 billion fund’s staff to begin active 
management of its “emerging market” equity investments and to hire new fund managers 
with an active, as opposed to passive or indexed, investment approach.  The trustees also 
142
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approved a list of “investibility screens” aimed at shaping the Fund's investments in 
emerging markets.   According to CalPERS, “the screens outline financial and economic 
factors, and three additional factors that include transparency, political stability and 
prohibitions on abusive labor practices.  Managers will now be selected based on their 
ability to invest in emerging markets and adherence to the Global Sullivan Principles and 
the International Labor Organization's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work.”144  The substance of the new CalPERS policy reflected the same issues raised 
by the PetroChina Campaign and, in fact, many of the individuals involved in the 
Campaign took part in the effort to shape and implement the new CalPERS policy.
The impact of the new policy was soon felt when CalPERS announced that it 
would suspend future equity investments in several countries, including Indonesia, 
Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines.  At the same time the fund announced it would 
open the door to new investment in Poland and Hungary due to improvements in those 
countries.145  The announcement sent share prices in several Asian markets tumbling and 
set off an intense round of negotiations as those countries attempted to make changes in 
domestic policy in order to win back CalPERS investments.146  Months of lobbying by 
144
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the Philippine government convinced CalPERS to reverse its position against equity 
investments there.  The fund agreed to back a new investment fund in Thailand sponsored 
by a private investment group and the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”), an arm 
of the World Bank but, so far, none of the committed capital has been invested.  The fund 
will “only make investments in companies that agree to comply with Government of 
Thailand and IFC environmental and social policies, including high standards of 
corporate governance and transparency.”147  A dialogue between CalPERS and senior 
Thai government officials is underway and the implementation of domestic reforms there 
may open the door to future investment.148  A similar policy is being considered by the 
New York City retirement system and the State of Connecticut public employees fund.149
A broader political campaign was underway as well.  The AFL-CIO and others in 
the loosely organized “PetroChina Coalition” argued that disclosure documents filed by 
PetroChina and Goldman Sachs with the SEC had all but ignored the risks highlighted by 
the Campaign.  Responding to these concerns a Congressionally created United States 
Commission on International Religious Freedom issued a report in May of 2000 that 
called for greater disclosure by PetroChina especially with respect to the use of proceeds 
from the IPO to pay off parent company CNPC debt.  “Millions of those dollars from 
CNPC’s sale of PetroChina shares may well end up benefiting” the joint venture in 
147
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Sudan.  The Commission called on the SEC to “be especially careful to investigate the 
adequacy and reliability of representations made in any filings related to the recent sale 
by CNPC and PetroChina of PetroChina shares.”150
This discussion led, in turn, to pressure for legislative or other regulatory reform 
with respect to disclosure by foreign corporations that attempt to issue securities in the 
U.S. capital markets.  In March of 2001, Republican congressman Frank Wolf, of 
Virginia, addressed a letter to Laura Unger, who was then serving as Acting Chairman of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission following the departure of longtime SEC 
Chairman Arthur Levitt.151  Congressman Wolf noted the role that PetroChina’s parent 
company CNPC played “in providing the Government of Sudan resources to carry out its 
war and atrocities against Southern Sudan” and contended, “more people are suffering 
and have died because of the PetroChina listing.”  He argued that the purchase of shares 
in the offering might have violated a 1997 Executive Order that imposed “comprehensive 
economic sanctions on Sudan.”  He urged Chairman Unger “to vigorously investigate this 
matter and take appropriate action” and argued that the apparent violation of the 
Executive Order “offers grounds for de-listing PetroChina from the NYSE [the New 
York Stock Exchange].”  He sent nearly identical letters to Secretary of the Treasury Paul 
O’Neil and Chairman of the New York Stock Exchange Richard Grasso.  He followed up 
the letter with a direct meeting with Unger and a second letter on April 2, 2001.
150
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Chairman Unger replied to the Wolf letters and meeting on May 8, 2001 with a 
detailed five page letter and the submission of a memorandum by David B.H. Martin, 
then Director of the Division of Corporate Finance of the SEC. 152  The Division has 
major responsibility for reviewing and assessing the disclosure provided by issuers of 
securities on a U.S. securities exchange, including the New York Stock Exchange where 
PetroChina had listed its securities.153  The Unger Letter detailed the actions that the SEC 
had taken in response to the Wolf inquiries and outlined several initiatives it planned to 
undertake in the near future.  The Chairman and staff of the SEC met or spoke with 
representatives of several of the organizations included in the PetroChina Campaign or 
knowledgeable about the offering including the Center for Security Policy, the U.S. 
Commission on International Religious Freedom, the U.S. State Department, and the 
Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”).154  In the discussions 
with other federal agencies the SEC “raised the possibility of interagency cooperation on 
Sudan.”155
The Chairman met with Directors of each of the SEC’s major divisions and she 
stated that “[t]hey are sensitized to this issue and will be looking for creative ways to 
152
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enhance investors’ access to material information about foreign investment in Sudan and 
its impact on the human rights situation there.”  (Emphasis added).  As suggested in the 
next section, this commitment is the crucial step taken by the Unger Letter.  It is 
reinforced by the several initiatives promised by the Chairman.  These include: a 
proposed rulemaking to require electronic filing by foreign companies who register their 
securities with the SEC; a new requirement that the SEC will end selective review of 
filings by certain foreign issuers and instead “review all registration statements filed by 
foreign companies which reflect material business dealings with governments or 
countries subject to U.S. economic sanctions”; a requirement of “enhanced disclosure” in 
securities filings by foreign issuers doing business in sanctioned countries; a commitment 
to bring to the attention of OFAC any disclosure in registration statements filed by 
foreign companies which “reflect material dealings” with countries subject to sanctions; 
and support for the “formation of an interagency working group on Sudan.”156
Part IV.  Some Initial Arguments.
Whether or not the Unger Letter was a “bombshell,” as the Financial Times
suggested, its release nonetheless certainly hit a nerve.  It seemed to confirm the worst 
fears of leading financial figures like Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan who 
quickly denounced efforts to attach political criteria to disclosure when given a chance in 
testimony to the Senate Banking Committee a few weeks after the release of the Letter.157
His opportunity to begin a counter-attack on the PetroChina Campaign came when asked 
156
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a very friendly question by then Chairman of the Committee, Senator Phil Gramm, 
Republican of Texas, in reference to proposed legislation that would have limited China’s 
ability to raise capital in the U.S. capital markets.  Gramm noted:
…Mr. Chairman [referring to Greenspan], as you’re aware, we have spent 
years battling the effort by [the] American government to use trade as a 
tool of foreign policy….And except for those pariah states, where we have 
virtually a state of war…we have gotten away from using economic trade 
as a tool of foreign policy.  We now have a new proposal…that seeks for 
the first time to use access to our banking system as an instrument of 
American foreign policy….[These] tools that are being used represent, in 
my opinion, a very real threat to our prosperity….158
The Chairman of the Federal Reserve embraced the concerns of Senator Gramm 
wholeheartedly: 
Well, Mr. Chairman, I certainly agree with the comments you have made, 
and I clearly understand the motives underlying Senator [Fred] 
Thompson’s bringing this amendment forward….[I]t’s the openness and 
the lack of political pressures within the [American financial] system 
which has made it such an effective component of our economy and 
indeed has drawn foreigners generally to the American markets for 
financing, as being the most efficient place where they can in many cases 
raise funds….[T]o the extent that we block foreigners from investing or 
raising funds in the United States, we probably undercut the viability of 
our own system….I’m not even sure how such a law would be effectively 
implemented….[I]f we were to block China or anybody else from 
borrowing in the United States, they could very readily borrow in London 
and be financed [there] by American investors….And therefore I must say, 
Mr. Chairman, I do join in your concerns about that amendment.  And I 
trust it would not move forward….159
158 Hearing on the Federal Reserve’s Report on Monetary Policy Before the Senate 
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Chairman Greenspan’s comments pose a serious challenge for proponents of human 
rights and other related “social” or “political” disclosure through the capital markets.  Is 
there really a debilitating paradox at work here, as Greenspan suggests?  Do efforts to 
advance the international human rights agenda through the capital markets have the effect 
of destroying the very functioning of those capital markets?  Traditional approaches to 
securities regulation provide a useful but, in the end, only partial response to this 
question.  A closer look at recent changes in the structure of the global capital markets, 
and in the political responses to the globalization process that underlies those structural 
changes, provide a useful supplement to our understanding.  This Part reviews each of 
these three in turn and suggests both their value and their limitations.
A.  The traditional securities law approach.
The core principle behind capital market regulation in the United States, and 
many other leading economies, particularly the United Kingdom, is quite 
straightforward.160  No security can be offered or sold in the United States unless the 
transaction is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission or an exemption 
to that registration requirement is available.  If a transaction is to be registered, then the 
seller of the security must provide adequate disclosure of all material information about 
the issuer and the security to potential purchasers.  Even in transactions where the seller 
has an available exemption, disclosure that is almost the equivalent of that provided in 
registered offerings will occur because of demand from potential buyers.  Disclosure it is 
160
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thought is, like sunshine, “the best of disinfectants.”161  The basic disclosure obligations 
were put in place in the 1930’s in response to a major capital shock that had brought the 
U.S. economy to a standstill.  Rampant conflicts of interest and obscure and overly 
complex financial schemes were found to pervade the securities industry.162  While the 
New Deal era architects of the new regime had much more ambitious plans for 
restructuring of the U.S. financial and corporate system, the disclosure requirements were 
their longest lasting and perhaps most significant reform.163
A key word in this basic disclosure framework is the concept of materiality, 
which has been the subject of agency interpretation and judicial pronouncement ever 
since the passage of the original securities acts.  And at one level the entire debate about 
whether or not human rights concerns belong inside the capital markets can be explored 
within the framework of the concept of materiality.  Understandably, given the mandate 
of the SEC, that is the way in which the Unger Letter frames the question.  Unger notes 
161
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that as a result of the campaign against the PetroChina IPO, the SEC had become 
“sensitized” to issues involving human rights and the capital markets.  She stated that the 
Commission and its staff would be “looking for creative ways to enhance investors’ 
access to material information” about issuers who access the U.S. capital markets and 
have investments in countries like the Sudan – where PetroChina’s parent company had 
significant operations – and the impact of such investments on human rights.164
A focus on materiality originally arose in the securities law regime because of 
important structural changes that were taking place in the forms of corporate organization 
and in the financial markets.165  As economic activity became more complex and grew in 
scale and scope in the early part of the 20th century, entrepreneurs were increasingly 
forced to widen their search for capital beyond family structures.  The corporate form of 
economic organization became dominant, along with its central structural characteristic –
the separation of ownership and control, described so vividly in the landmark study by 
Berle and Means written in the wake of the 1929 Crash.166  Berle and Means were in a 
sense frightened by the emergence of a separation between ownership and control of the 
164 Supra text and accompanying notes ___.
165
 There exists an important literature on industrial organization that receives too little 
attention in legal scholarship on corporations.  See Scott R. Bowman, The Modern 
Corporation and American Political Thought (1996), William G. Roy, Socializing 
Capital:  The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America (1997), Martin J. Sklar, 
The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916:  The Market, The 
Law and Politics (1988), and Maurice Zeitlin, The Large Corporation and Contemporary 
Classes (1989).  An important exception to my contention that this literature remains 
largely outside of legal scholarship is Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of 
Capitalism (1985) who relied heavily in his transaction cost theory of the corporation and 
its governance on the work of Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial 
Revolution in American Business (1977).
166
 Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
(1932) (hereafter “Berle and Means”).
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modern corporation, between a dispersed shareholder base and a centralized managerial 
group, because of the implications that a concentration of economic power in small 
groups of insiders had for a democracy.   This structure was both a solution to an 
emerging problem, the increasing complexity of modern industry, and a cause of a new 
set of problems, namely problems of governance within the new framework and between 
this new corporate world and the surrounding polity.167
Modern securities regulation helped to solve the new problems by providing 
shareholders a consistent and reliable information package in the form of regular 
disclosure by publicly traded corporations and disclosure about security offerings made 
by corporations.  The concept of materiality – understood to mean the meaningful 
provision of information that a reasonable investor requires to make an informed 
investment decision168 – lies at the heart of this disclosure regime.  It is widely believed 
that the requirement that companies provide material information on a regular basis to 
167
 The Berle-Means thesis has been viewed as a foundation for both what might be 
called the “social protection” framework (probably most important to Berle and Means 
themselves) that animated securities law analysis in the New Deal and much of the 
Keynesian era but also for the “agency cost” perspectives of law and economics thinking 
that has dominated the securities law field for the past two decades.  Whereas Berle and 
Means saw the problem as one of using law to shape the behavior of managers now in 
“control” of the new powerful monopolistic post-private property industrial groups to
enhance the larger “community” interest, the “law and economics” school attempted to 
use the concept of “agency” costs to mount a market driven counter-revolution against 
what they see as the potential for opportunistic managerial behavior in firms that are still 
living in a world of private property.  See Berle and Means at 351, 356; Adolf A. Berle, 
High Finance: Master or Servant, 23 Yale Rev. 43 (1933) cited in Seligman, supra note 
__; Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1986).  A recent 
appraisal of both approaches is considered in William W. Bratton, Berle and Means 
Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. of Corp. Law 737 (2001).
168 TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see infra text 
accompanying note ___.
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shareholders and potential investors helps to close the gap between owners and managers, 
or, in the language of “law and economics,” helps lower the costs associated with the 
principal-agent problem created by the separation of ownership and control.169
It should not seem like too big a step for the SEC to take when it acknowledges 
that disclosure about potential human rights violations by a corporation or associated with 
a corporation’s operations could be considered material to a potential investor.  The SEC 
already requires companies to disclose details about their environmental liabilities, 
potential problems related to intellectual property and relationships with employees.  The 
SEC long ago agreed to increase disclosure of so-called “soft” information such as 
projections about the future course of a company’s business model, providing a safe 
harbor for forward looking statements.170  In fact, the triumph of the “efficient market 
hypothesis”171 would appear to reinforce the requirement that progressive effort be made 
to expand the reach of disclosure requirements.  Because the hypothesis mandates that 
past, or hard, information is of little use to the evaluation of a company’s future 
prospects, the door was opened to the requirement that soft information about the impact 
of future events be disclosed to the markets.172  More recently, the SEC signaled its 
169
 Jensen and Meckling supra note ___.
170
 Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084, [1979 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P82,117 (July 2, 1979) (adopting Exchange Act rule 3b-
6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1986), and Securities Act rule 175, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1986)).
171 See Basic Incorporated v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
172 See William J. Carney, Defining a Security: The Addition of a Market-Oriented 
Contextual Approach to Investment Contract Analysis, 33 Emory L.J. 311, 340 
(“[I]nvestors are only concerned with expected future earnings, inspection of information 
about future prospects might loom large as a major feature of investor protection. It is in 
the nature of such statements that they are not fully verifiable.”)
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interest in increasing the level of disclosure by companies of what are called 
“intangibles,” such as human capital and intellectual property.173  The mandate of the 
Unger Letter is entirely consistent with this approach.
Nonetheless, in addition to the competitive and other concerns raised by Alan 
Greenspan, some commentators worry that Chairman Unger has opened up a kind of 
Pandora’s box.  A recent Note in the Harvard Law Review commented: 
One observer has suggested that the Unger Letter will ‘lead to lobbying 
for further measures by the SEC to demand additional disclosure on 
environmental or broader human rights grounds.’ Indeed. Not to mention 
equal employment opportunity, workplace and consumer safety, and any 
other political or social concern implicated by corporate behavior.  If the 
SEC has concluded that information unrelated to a firm’s financial 
performance may nonetheless be material, then it has opened a door to all 
types of mandated disclosure.174
This comment reflects a disconcerting misreading of current securities law requirements 
which, as noted above, mandate a wealth of complex disclosure requirements that already 
can or do include much of what the Note’s author worries about.175  In addition, the 
173
 SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks Before the AICPA Governing Council (Oct. 
22, 2001).  Such an effort has a good deal of support among business managers.  Three 
Fourths of Portfolio Managers Surveyed Find Pro Forma Reporting Useful, PR 
Newswire, Nov. 7, 2001 (“Sixty percent of managers want more information about 
intangible assets, and six out of 10 want more detailed disclosures about internally 
generated intangibles, such as the value of brand names, customer lists, among other 
items.”)
174
 Note, Should the SEC Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure Requirements? 115 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1433, 1435 (2002) (emphasis added). 
175
 Imagine Johns Manville not disclosing the risks associated with asbestos litigation or 
the Denny’s restaurant chain not disclosing to investors the progress of litigation related 
to charges of racial discrimination in its restaurants.  More recently, American 
multinational corporations have been found to be potentially liable in American courts for 
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comment seems to have been made in ignorance of the origins of the Unger Letter in the 
PetroChina Campaign where, as this article demonstrates, it was not whether to disclose 
certain non-traditional risk factors (since PetroChina made extensive disclosures of non-
traditional information) but how to disclose them in a manner that investors found 
meaningful.  As the Martin Memorandum transmitted to Cong. Wolf by Chairman Unger 
notes, “the Supreme Court has held that information is material if ‘there is substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in making an 
investment decision.’ TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).”176
That disclosure about human rights violations or violations of U.S. economic sanctions 
are unusual or non-traditional is not to be doubted, but there is little basis to suggest that 
that alone renders such disclosure non-material, even if one takes the traditional approach 
to materiality adopted by the SEC which “generally focuses on matters that have affected, 
or will affect, a company’s profitability and financial outlook.”177  Indeed, that is the 
human rights violations committed in association with their operations in foreign 
countries, thus highlighting the need recognized by the Unger Letter to enhance corporate 
disclosure related to such developments to investors.  See Doe v. Unocal, 248 F.3d 915 
(9th Cir. 2001).
176
 Martin Memorandum at 2.
177
 “[R]ecognizing that investors invest primarily to obtain an economic return is not 
fundamentally inconsistent with requiring expanded environmental disclosure, civil rights 
disclosure, and other sorts of social disclosure. Expanded social disclosure is extremely 
useful for the investor qua economic investor, because the information disclosed may 
portend future economic conditions, even if it is not ‘economically material’ at the time 
of disclosure.” Williams supra note ___ at 1251 (note 280).  SEC rules provide a catchall 
that provides the Commission a great deal of flexibility in setting disclosure 
requirements.  See Rule 408, Securities Act, 17 C.F.R. 230.408 (1988) (“In addition to 
the information expressly required to be included in a registration statement, there shall 
be added such further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the 
required statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not 
misleading.”)
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grounding provided by the SEC in the Martin Memorandum.  Equally important in 
securities law, however, is the meaningful nature of disclosure, something that is just as 
much, if not more, at issue in securities law since the PetroChina Campaign.  “The 
registration process established under the [Securities] Act [of 1933] is designed to require 
disclosure to investors in a meaningful manner of the material facts concerning securities 
which are offered to members of the public.”  Securities and Exchange Commission v. 
Great Western Land & Development, Inc., et al., 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9834 (D.Ct. 
Az.) (emphasis added).178
The fact that the Harvard Law Review Note is grounded in a “law and economics” 
analysis may explain its limitations.179    The standard set of law and economics 
objections to the established securities law regime include concern about federal as 
opposed to state regulation of the financial markets and, as noted above,180 stronger 
objections to the once widely accepted norm that the market itself is not likely to mandate 
such disclosure if left to its own devices.  These federalist and private ordering 
objections to the securities law regime do raise important concerns and often highlight 
178
 For a persuasive argument that expanded social disclosure can be mandated by the 
SEC under proxy rules of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”), the 
companion statute to the Securities Act of 1933, see Williams supra note ___ at 1207 
(“the SEC has the authority to require expanded social disclosure under section 14(a)” of 
the 1934 Act).
179
 On law and economics generally see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of the 
Law (1998); in the context of corporate finance, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991). 
180 Supra text accompanying note ___.
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flaws in regulatory practice.181  Nonetheless, these issues are not triggered in particular 
by the efforts to add human rights disclosure to the regime. The decision about whether 
or not human rights disclosure is a good thing or not seems a priori to the discussion of 
what institutional means should be adopted to make sure the goals agreed upon are 
reached.  Furthermore, the emergence of the PetroChina Syndrome reflects a change in 
the nature of the global economy.  The institutions that have traditionally regulated 
economic activity must adapt to reflect those changes.  Traditional law and economics 
analysis provides only a partial explanation for the PetroChina Syndrome and thus will be 
inadequate to the task of mapping an institutional future for the global economy.  
There is a further potential objection from law and economics, however, that 
might be more appropriately raised by the evolution in the disclosure regime indicated by 
the Unger Letter.  Opponents of this kind of disclosure could conceivably argue that the 
requirements of the Letter amount to a regulatory taking182 if it were found that the new 
disclosure regime was strict enough that it might either prevent companies from raising 
capital in the U.S. securities markets – as suggested is indeed possible by the Lukoil 
181
 On federalism see Easterbrook and Fischel supra note ___; on private ordering see 
David D. Friedman, Law’s Order: What economics has to do with law and why it matters 
(2001).
182 The core of support for a doctrine that a regulation can be a “taking” is found in the 
U.S. Constitution:  "Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V.  The classic formulation of the principle of a 
regulatory taking is generally thought to be found in Justice Holmes opinion for the 
Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (“The general rule at least 
is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it 
will be recognized as a taking.”); Brauneis supra note ___ at 616-15  (“The Holmes 
opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist concludes, was ‘the foundation of our ‘regulatory 
takings’ jurisprudence.’” Citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 
U.S. 470, 508 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).) 
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example183 – or because it might force companies to restructure their operations in 
significant ways in order to provide the markets with positive sounding disclosure.  The 
latter possibility assumes, of course, that companies will be reluctant to affirm that they 
do indeed violate international human rights or progressive corporate governance 
standards.  For example, one of the arguments raised by the oil industry is that it is forced 
to operate in parts of the world where there are all sorts of bad actors.  They have to go 
where the oil is and deal with whomever controls it, thus some level of association with 
human rights violations seems almost inevitable.  There are problems with this view of 
international business activity and with the way that oil companies use this argument.  
There is, for example, an extensive and rapidly growing literature on socially responsible 
business activity that undermines the cogency of this position from within the business 
community itself.184  Nonetheless, one could imagine the development of a counter-attack 
to the Unger Letter logic from business along these lines.
There is a natural response to the potential takings complaint based in the analysis 
suggested above regarding the expansion of the disclosure regime mandated by the Unger 
Letter.185  I argued there that the commitment by Chairman Unger to look for “creative 
ways to enhance investors’ access to material information” about human rights violations 
was consistent with the general principles articulated for many years by the SEC with 
respect to disclosure.  There is, therefore, in the SEC’s approach to disclosure the kind of 
183 Supra text accompanying notes ___.
184
 See http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/corpgov/csr/backgrnd_rdgs.html. See Press 
Release, United Nations Global Compact, Global Compact and World Bank Institute 
Cooperate on CSR Program, Mar. 6, 2003. 
185 See supra text accompanying notes ___.
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“structural habit” that Holmes suggested placed a limit on the application of the takings 
argument.186  As Robert Brauneis has written: 
Holmes thought that the positive law of a jurisdiction could be described, 
not just as an accidental aggregation of specific, unrelated rules, but as a 
body of law that exhibited an internal structure, organized around a variety 
of principles or paradigm cases. Those “structural habits” provided a basis 
for assessing how much change in positive law a particular piece of 
legislation caused….The "property" protected by the Constitution is not a 
theorist's ideal, but the actual, established practice of a particular legal 
tradition….[the regulation in question] must be evaluated in terms of how 
different it is from established practice….[Where] it "is not different in 
fundamental principle" - it does not amount to so drastic a change as to 
require compensation.187
Holmes’ view was that only “radical, discontinuous alterations” in one’s property rights 
where “change was measured as deviation from fundamental principles, or structural 
habits, embedded in the organized body of standing positive law” were deserving of 
Constitutional protection, Brauneis argues.188
There is another deeper dimension to this argument that must be considered.  The 
flip side of a regulatory taking, particularly in a world of global capital flows, is 
“regulatory arbitrage.”  This occurs where corporations take advantage of the flexibility 
and liquidity of global capital markets to run around efforts by states to regulate corporate 
activity in the public interest.189  When this occurs it can be assumed to offend a 
186 Interstate C. S. R. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87 (1907)  (“Structural habits 
count for as much as logic in drawing the line.”)
187 Brauneis supra note __ at 647-8 (citing Id.).
188 Id. at 701.
189
 See Kellye Y. Testy, Comity and Cooperation: Securities Regulation in a Global 
Marketplace, 45 Ala. L. Rev. 927 (1994) (“conflicts among national regulatory regimes 
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particularly deep “structural habit.” Normally this is thought of as a “race to the bottom” 
as opposed to a “race to the top.”190  Typically, those who normatively favor government 
regulation argue that issuers will try to lower their costs by issuing securities, or 
chartering their corporation, in a jurisdiction with the least onerous, and perhaps least 
socially protective, regulatory schema.  Thus an overarching regulatory framework is 
necessary to prevent issuer arbitrage that slowly but surely eats away at socially desirable 
standards.  Meanwhile, those who are more skeptical about the efficacy of government 
intervention argue that, in a competitive market, prices will accurately reflect investors 
preferences for a particular regulatory regime and thus an efficient market for the 
securities of a company can help police the regime choice.  
may encourage regulatory arbitrage as well as ill will among and between nations”).  See 
also Amir N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International Securities Regulation in 
a World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38 Va. J. Int'l L. 563 (1998) (“foreign listing 
becomes a medium through which undesired effects can be exported from one country to 
another”); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 2359 (1998) (advocating regulatory competition);.  Licht 
argues that financial arbitrage can ameliorate the impact of regulatory arbitrage because 
in an efficient market the price of the company’s stock will reflect the value that investors 
place on the company’s choice or, in the case of a dual listing, its mix, of regulatory 
regimes.  In some sense that is precisely what happened when PetroChina attempted its 
IPO.  The PetroChina Campaign was part of the process by which information about the 
company was integrated into the market price – a price, as indicated, that the underwriters 
adjusted downward as poor investor reaction during the road show accumulated. 
190 See Licht supra note ___ at ___ (“Virtually all the existing literature on international 
securities regulation is preoccupied with two basic issues: the question of regulatory 
competition among national regulatory regimes, and the related problem of 
extraterritorial application of such regimes (extraterritorial jurisdiction).  At the heart of 
the debate stands the likelihood of detrimental regulatory arbitrage - the so called ‘race to 
the bottom’ - if issuers migrated to markets with lower-quality regulation. The 
alternatives to this scenario are a beneficial ‘race to the top’ or to some middle-range 
‘optimum’. From these scenarios different conclusions may be drawn about the need for 
regulatory intervention.”)
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But I am suggesting a different kind of problem.  Issuers who wish to raise capital  
may not be able to assure investors of a high enough return on their investment to 
overcome the concerns raised in their home market where the normal protections 
available to investors do not exist.   In such a case, the issuer may attempt to partially 
“expropriate” the reputation value possessed by a highly regulated and efficient market, 
such as that of the United States in order to raise capital at a lower price than would 
otherwise be possible.  Another way of stating the problem is to suggest that insiders may 
be able to obscure informational asymmetries that give them an advantage over outside 
potential purchasers of the company’s securities by hiding behind the positive veil that 
listing in a well established and highly regulated market may offer.  Some scholars 
appear to address this problem by identifying a subset of issues associated with the 
general set of issues called “international regulatory competition.”191  The subset looks at 
the possibility of “piggybacking” where issuers, as Licht points out, “may want to list 
their stocks on foreign markets with a view to improve their corporate governance, 
thereby creating shareholder value.”192  Licht argues that while most commentators 
conclude that this is evidence of a “race to the top” with the consequence of increases in 
shareholder value, his own research on Israeli companies that list extraterritorially in the 
United States provides evidence of a “race to the bottom” as managers take advantage of 
a weaker corporate governance regime in the United States.193
191 Id.
192 Amir N. Licht, Managerial Opportunism and Foreign Listing: Some Direct Evidence, 
22 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 325, 326 (2001).
193 Id. at 326 (“piggybacking may also have a dark side in the sense that foreign listing 
transactions could be guided, inter alia, by managerial opportunism”); but see Roberta 
Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 Theoretical 
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I argue, however, that an issuer of securities in a wholly state owned enterprise 
could engage in an exceptional form of “managerial opportunism” in order to appropriate 
the value associated with the extraterritorial listing.  This risk of opportunism seems 
likely to increase when one considers an SOE in an undemocratic society.  The clash of 
competing interests of the multiple constituencies found in the SOE’s of post WW II 
social democratic Europe, for example, would help mitigate the risk of managerial 
opportunism by greatly increasing the transparency and accountability of the offering 
process.  But that is precisely what is absent in countries like China where the regime has 
delayed democratization while attempting to undertake market reforms.  The legitimating 
impact of interest group pluralism, central to the structure of the post WW II democratic 
states, is entirely absent in the Stalinist form of state ownership.194  Thus, what seems like 
a “regulatory taking” – the imposition of a particular disclosure regime regarding human 
rights – may be more properly understood as the only available corrective for this new 
form of regulatory arbitrage.  
PetroChina knew that it had no chance to raise billions of dollars on its domestic
Shanghai stock exchange.  The Chinese government places far greater limits on capital 
liquidity than in the United States or Europe and institutional investors consider the level 
of corruption there to be intolerably high.195  Thus, not surprisingly, the quality of the 
Inq. L. 387 (2001) (“there is no evidence supporting the claim that competition would
result in a race to the bottom, with issuers choosing the lowest level of disclosure 
possible”).
194 A substitute form of legitimization does take place in such regimes, as suggested at the 
outset of this article but it is largely driven by ideology rather than institutional structure.
195 Rahul Jacob, Graft in Asia on rise, says business, Fin. Times, Mar. 13, 2003 at 9 
(“Graft is endemic in China: according to the most conservative estimates, the magnitude 
of corruption ranges from 3 to 5 per cent of GDP”).
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corporations that offer their shares only domestically in China is considered far worse 
than those that are able to make international offerings.  Hence, Chinese issuers suffer a 
reputation effect or, rather, they add, perhaps inappropriately, to the value of their 
reputations if they can figure out a way to list successfully overseas, ideally in New York 
or London but at least in Hong Kong.  For years, Chinese mainland companies have 
understood this problem and when seeking to raise their profile, and to raise significant 
amounts of new capital, have listed shares on the Honk Kong exchange.  
PetroChina was not only formed to step around its parent company’s operations in 
Sudan but to attempt to sidestep the very serious issues that undermine the ability of 
China’s own domestic stock exchanges to attract significant capital investment.  China’s 
new form of regulatory arbitrage was the equivalent of a kind of “social dumping”196
when it attempted to foist the securities of its reorganized state owned enterprises on 
unwitting foreign investors who would otherwise never invest directly through a 
domestic Chinese exchange in the same company.  As discussed above, there was little 
reassurance offered U.S. investors that somehow the listing requirements of the New 
York Stock Exchange or the rules and regulations that govern corporate behavior 
196
 See generally Catherine Barnard, Social Dumping and the Race to the Bottom: Some 
Lessons for the European Union from Delaware, 25 Eur. L. Rev. 57 (2000) 
(demonstrating how competition between jurisdictions in a deregulated internal market 
lowers standards, inducing market participants to flock to the state with the lowest social 
standards, thus leading to a race to the bottom); Mark Barenberg, Law and Labor in the 
New Global Economy: Through the Lens of United States Federalism, 33 Colum. J. 
Transnat'l L. 445 (“The substantive legal standards implemented by federal authorities 
may permit social dumping in the form of movements of capital either across the borders 
of geographic, public institutions…or across the boundaries of functional, private 
institutions….”).
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generally in the United States could actually be enforced against a company whose 
management would remain firmly in the hands of the Chinese Communist Party.197
B. A Structural Approach.
At the core of the transition to a world of global capital markets is a shift away 
from commercial banks as our most important financial intermediaries to a range of new 
financial institutions, including pension funds, mutual funds, university endowments and 
a new world of wealthy and sophisticated individual investors who provide funding for 
the private equity world of hedge funds, buyout groups and venture capital.  A study 
published by the American Enterprise Institute in the mid-1990’s documented this 
significant development.198  As the study noted:
For more than two centuries banks in the United States were the main 
repository of household savings and the primary source of credit for 
businesses.  They occupied the central role in the intermediation of credit.  
In the 1980s and 1990s all that…changed.  Innovations in financial 
markets…allowed many borrowers to bypass banks entirely, and newly 
developed nonbank financial intermediaries…invaded the traditional turf 
of banks by taking their customers and undercutting their profitability.  
During those two decades banks [saw] their share of traditional financial 
intermediation steadily eroded as non-bank financial 
intermediaries…provided better substitutes for traditional banking services 
and as innovations in the financial markets…enable[d] business borrowers 
to directly access credit markets for their funds.199
This is further evidenced by changes in the macro-economy.  As a percentage of personal 
disposable income, U.S. savings have dropped steadily over the last twenty years, from a 
197
 See supra text accompanying notes ___.
198
 Franklin R. Edwards, The New Finance: Regulation & Financial Stability (1996).
199 Id. at 10.
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post World War II high of 10.9 percent in 1982 to a post-WW II low of 2.3 percent in 
2001.200  Meanwhile during the same time period there has been an explosion of 
borrowing through the capital markets.  Credit market borrowing by the domestic non-
financial sector of the economy grew explosively in the last 25 years from $194 billion 
per year in 1975 to $2 trillion in 2001, representing an increase of more than 300%.201
Growth of total credit market debt outstanding for the domestic non-financial sector 
mirrored this expansion, rising from approximately $2.3 billion in 1975 to nearly $20 
trillion in 2001.202 This borrowing, of course, points to the new intermediaries, the 
financial players who are engaged in purchasing these debt instruments on behalf of the 
new creditors, namely pension funds and investment companies.  “Their share of 
intermediary assets grew from 20 percent in 1980 to almost 40 percent in 1994, and that 
growth shows no sign of abating.”203  Pension funds alone owned more than 32% of the 
outstanding value of U.S. equities held by households in 2000.204
If pension funds and mutual funds, among others, are the key new financial 
players, this fact has not been lost upon those who manage such funds nor upon those 
who are the beneficiaries of such funds.  Most importantly, one of the central institutions 
200
 National Accounts Data, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of 
Commerce at http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn1.htm.
201
 Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, The Federal Reserve Board at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/Z1/Current/annuals/a1975-1984.pdf and at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/Z1/Current/annuals/a1995-2001.pdf. Release 
date: Dec. 5, 2002.
202 Id.
203
 Edwards, supra note ___, at 16.
204
 Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, The Federal Reserve Board at  
http://www.federalreserve.gov//Pubs/Bulletin/2001/0701lead.pdf at 437.
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of what could be called the older, and perhaps now exhausted, “Industrial Relations” era, 
the trade union movement, also plays a key role in this new “Capital Markets” era.205
Thus, as noted above, the AFL-CIO’s affiliates control directly pension funds with 
financial assets currently valued at some $400 billion.  Indirectly, as trustees of plans 
jointly sponsored with employers or the public sector, the labor movement oversees funds 
with assets valued at approximately $5 trillion.  Under the new leadership of the AFL-
CIO, which took office in 1995, the labor movement has established in its Washington, 
D.C. headquarters, a Department of Corporate Affairs and an Office of Investment, and 
has sponsored the establishment of a non-profit entity called the Center for Working 
Capital.  These new organizations attempt to mobilize the financial resources found in the 
pension fund assets of union workforces in support of the labor movement’s broad goals, 
including international labor standards and human rights, progressive forms of corporate 
governance and democratic political change in emerging markets, and other forms of 
socially responsible investment, while maintaining the long term returns to the funds.  In 
addition the AFL-CIO is working on an international effort to promote a similar approach 
by labor movements in other countries.  The major international labor umbrella group, 
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions based in Brussels, is the sponsor of 
a Global Task Force that coordinates cross-border campaigns in the capital markets.
While the PetroChina campaign became the signature event of this new 
movement, it is not the only example.  Just prior to its intervention in that effort, in late 
1999 and early 2000, the AFL-CIO responded to a call for assistance by the German trade 
union movement in the battle which erupted after a hostile takeover bid was announced 
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by Vodafone, the upstart British mobile phone company, for Mannesmann, the giant 
century-old German industrial concern.  In this campaign a further dimension of the labor 
movement’s leverage in the financial markets became clear.  While union pension funds 
owned only a small percentage of the shares of Mannesmann and, thus, could not likely 
have a significant effect on the outcome of the tender offer, the fund managers who are 
hired by pension funds to manage their investments controlled on behalf of their various 
clients some 13% of the shares of Mannesmann.  
In what has become the standard approach of the AFL-CIO in such campaigns, 
they wrote a detailed letter to managers of pension funds that argued against the takeover 
bid, linking traditional union concerns with the fiduciary duty of fund managers and
trustees to protect the asset value of their beneficiaries.206  The letter was released 
publicly and brought to the attention of Wall Street analysts, many of whom, of course, 
work for the same financial institutions as the fund managers of the major pension funds.  
The threat of opposition to the bid was taken seriously enough by the Vodafone team that 
Vodafone CEO Chris Gent made a strenuous effort to engage AFL-CIO President John 
Sweeney in discussions about the bid and then, when Sweeney refused to engage in such 
discussions without the participation of German union leaders, Gent made several written 
public statements reassuring the German work force that the takeover bid would not 
disturb existing labor-management relations.  In the final days of the acquisition, Gent 
finally entered into face-to-face negotiations with the German union leadership –
206
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something he had thought he could avoid and something that is indeed relatively rare in 
the mergers and acquisitions environment.
A more recent and ongoing example is the international campaign by the labor 
movement to support efforts to restore democracy in Burma, which has been ruled by a 
brutal military dictatorship for several decades.  Labor has joined with a wide range of 
non-governmental organizations to oppose companies that continue to invest in Burma.  
Initially these efforts focused on Unocal, the California based oil company, which built a 
natural gas pipeline across Burma in a joint venture with the military.  Widespread 
human rights abuses are known to have accompanied this project, including forced labor 
to build the project, forced relocations of villagers, and killings, beatings and rapes of 
villagers who resisted the project.  The AFL-CIO introduced a shareholder resolution 
calling on Unocal to respond to these charges and to set aside a portion of its profits from 
the pipeline in a trust fund for the future economic development of a democratic 
Burma.207  More recently, as noted above, the AFL-CIO joined with British unions to 
pressure Premier Oil, a British company, which continues to operate in Burma.  In 
particular, the AFL-CIO asked the American oil company, Amerada Hess to either use its 
25% stake in Premier to pressure Premier to withdraw or else to sell of its stake in the 
company.208
While many of these capital market campaigns focus on intervening in the capital 
markets to stop a transaction when organized labor believes its core principles are 
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implicated, the trade union movement is also developing a framework for changing the 
way that Wall Street and corporations think about investment decisions.  It wants to 
broaden the core concepts that motivate basic investment decisions – in a sense, to 
endogenize human rights, democratic politics and progressive corporate governance into 
the concept of materiality, on the investor side, and into the concept of valuation on the 
company side.  An important example of this approach was the decision by CalPERS, the 
California Public Employees Retirement System which manages more than $150 billion 
in assets, to put in place an “investment screen” to control the way its fund managers 
invest its members assets in the equity markets of the so-called “emerging market 
countries.”   Now those investment decisions must include weighting for the core labor 
standards established by the International Labor Organization, which include a right to 
freedom of association, the right to engage in collective bargaining, and prohibitions
against the use of forced labor and abusive child labor and against discrimination in 
employment.  Thus, the PetroChina Campaign reflects in part a structural shift to a new 
environment where capital markets have important social and political effects.  But that 
has not meant that the older institutional players such as organized labor have been left 
behind.
C. A political approach.
It is organized labor that has lost the most as a result of the end of the Industrial 
Relations era and it is particularly motivated to develop its role as an institutional investor 
in the new Capital Markets era.  But it is not just the labor movement that has begun to 
notice the potential for advancing a political agenda through the capital markets.  In that 
earlier era, collective bargaining and union activity was understood to be a complement 
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to traditional parallel political institutions.  “Industrial democracy” on the shop floor 
stimulated workers interest in and understanding of broader democratic processes.209  In 
addition, the exercise of freedom of speech and association in the workplace, once fought 
for and won, was not likely to be given up lightly in society at large.210  Thus, labor 
unions have been seen as a key force in civil society that serves as a counterweight to the 
concentration of power in financial, corporate, or government bodies.  Some used this 
perspective to argue that unions are a natural component of U.S. politics and the 
American model of industrial capitalism.  It was this kind of approach to labor-
management relations that made industrial relations ideology a central part of U.S. 
foreign policy in the Cold War.  There is more than coincidence in the fact that “Wild 
Bill” Donovan, the founder of the Office of Strategic Services (“OSS”), the forerunner of 
the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), practiced labor law and that William Colby, 
head of the Phoenix counterinsurgency program in Vietnam and later a Director of the 
CIA, began his career as a lawyer for the National Labor Relations Board.  The OSS 
itself had a very active labor branch during World War II, “created to work with Socialist 
trade union groups in the European underground.”211  The CIA played a central role in 
attempting to use the American Industrial Relations system and ideology as part of a 
wider effort to combat the success of Stalinism during the Cold War.  Colby, for 
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example, was directly involved in such efforts in post World War II Italy.212  Other 
leading figures of the post war era who came out of the Industrial Relations era included 
Clark Kerr, President of the University of California during its Free Speech Movement, 
economists John Dunlop and John Kenneth Galbraith at Harvard, and George Schultz, 
first at the University of Chicago and Stanford and later the holder of four Cabinet level 
positions, including Secretary of Labor, State and Treasury.  These are only intriguing 
bits of anecdotal evidence, of course, but there is little doubt that for most of the Cold 
War, the United States professed to support collective bargaining and unionization as a 
vital bulwark against “totalitarianism.”213
In the post-Cold War era of globalized capital markets this particular dimension
of U.S. foreign policy and domestic legitimation has been undermined.  Certainly this is 
one of the factors that motivate labor’s interest in advancing a capital markets strategy.  
The Cold War era foreign policy establishment, however, has not simply disappeared into 
investment banks, business schools or early retirement.  While adherents of a neo-liberal 
free trade ideology have been the dominant force in American foreign policy over the last 
two decades or so, a group of “neo-conservatives” emerged from a pro-labor wing of the 
Cold War to fight what was often, until September 11, a rear guard battle to promote a 
foreign policy that it views as vital to the narrower national interests of the United 
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States.214  The idea of leading multilateral missions to stop “ethnic cleansing” in obscure 
European countries like the former Yugoslavia or genocide in Rwanda was not on their 
list.  In the first few months of the Bush Administration it looked as if this perspective on 
foreign policy was, in fact, gaining the upper hand.  The appointment of a foreign policy 
team linked to the Ford Administration and the Cold War era not to the era of 
globalization, the withdrawal of the United States from the Kyoto environmental treaty, 
and the confrontation with China over a downed spy plane, all hinted at the return of 
unilateralism defined by a vaguely defined “national interest” in contradistinction to the 
pure globalization, market ueber alles view of many in the Clinton era.
Some in this national interest layer in American politics saw the PetroChina 
campaign as a way to put itself back on the political map at a turning point in American 
politics.  Though of secondary importance relative to the weight on the AFL-CIO and 
large institutional investors, an important force in the campaign against the IPO was led 
by the Center for Security Policy, a Washington think tank with links to the neo-
conservative William Casey Institute headed by former investment banker Roger 
Robinson.  This Center forms the core of a somewhat broader political group that has 
supported some of the Congressional activism that led to the issuance of the Unger 
Letter, including ties to Congressman Wolf and Senator Brownback, Republican of 
Kansas, and then Senator Fred Thompson, Republican of Tennessee, who have all been 
active on religious freedom, China and human rights issues.  Of course, the literature 
issued by this wing of the PetroChina Campaign rarely mentioned the layoffs of nearly a 
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million workers that would follow a successful restructuring of the Company, nor the 
absence in China of free and independent trade unions to provide workers a voice in the 
shock therapy now being implemented by that regime to its domestic economy.  Instead 
their concern – one that was indeed shared by the labor movement – focused on the 
denial of religious freedom and the use of forced labor by the Chinese oil industry in the 
Sudan.  Ironically, while the national interest perspective appears to have made some 
headway in the Bush Administration, that national interest is, of course, in the process of 
being radically redefined.  And, ironically, one of the first beneficiaries of the new post 
9/11 war against terrorism was Sudan.  One of the promises dangled in front of the 
Sudanese regime in return for some kind of support for the anti-terror effort was the 
possibility of lifting the sanctions in place against that regime for its human rights 
violations.  Some in the neo-conservative national interest camp are calling foul.  “The 
Bush administration risks appearing craven where they too pretend that Sudan warrants a 
clean bill of political health based on Khartoum’s assistance to fight terrorism,” 
according to Roger Robinson of the Center for Security Policy, a right wing foreign 
policy group.215
There is, of course, some reflection of national interest politics in today’s labor 
movement.  Its heaviest concentration remains in parts of the international affairs 
apparatus of the AFL-CIO.  But, in general, the Cold War anti-communist character of 
the labor movement has disappeared.  The effort of the Sweeney administration to 
establish a new internationalism as the basis of an independent foreign policy for the 
global labor movement has been successful within much of labor.  This is the approach 
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that animates labor’s campaigns on international trade and finance as seen in labor’s 
presence at the Seattle WTO demonstrations in 1999 and at the annual meetings of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  While this movement waned 
somewhat in reaction to the terrorist attacks on September 11, it is likely to be a 
permanent feature of international politics.  The recent massive demonstrations against 
the war with Iraq indicate the persistent significance of an emerging independent world 
public opinion.216
In addition to the neo-liberal, national interest and new internationalist 
perspectives, there is also a mirror image to the national interest approach found in 
developing, or so-called “emerging market,” countries.  While having obtained some 
additional leverage over the world system because of their newfound “comparative 
advantage” (i.e., their ability to offer global corporations cheap labor)217 many of these 
countries still find themselves locked out of key markets in the advanced countries and 
far behind in key areas of economic growth, like high technology.  In response, there has 
emerged in many of these countries what might be called a neo-mercantilism as they 
negotiate their way around the new institutions of the global economy.218  Examples of 
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this dynamic include the debates underway over the value of capital controls219 or the 
right to produce cheaply drugs to fight AIDS in the developing world are.220  The politics 
of neo-mercantilism is likely to be a source of resistance to efforts like the PetroChina 
Campaign, though domestic labor movements in some of these countries have welcomed 
the new internationalist approach of the AFL-CIO, which represents a significant shift 
from the Cold War era links to official U.S. foreign policy.
One can delineate, therefore, four different political camps in the post -Cold War 
period:  the neo-liberal model has animated the core of U.S. international economic 
policy in the Capital Markets era and is the source of the strongest opposition to the use 
of the capital markets as an arena to advance human rights221; the neo-mercantilists of the 
Third World are also likely to oppose such efforts though for their own narrower 
interests, particularly as a bargaining chip to use inside the new global institutions like 
the WTO; the national interest or neo-conservative element inside the United States 
welcomes the capital markets initiatives but they have a more limited agenda defined by 
their real focus on advancing a particularly hawkish approach to U.S. foreign policy; 
finally, there is what I believe is the central motivating force behind the anti-globalization 
movement and the kind of capital markets initiative evidenced in the PetroChina 
Campaign – the new internationalism actively promoted by the AFL-CIO and its sister 
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organizations in the global labor movement and among its friends in environmental and 
human rights organizations.
Part V.  The New Era: From Keynes to Friedman.
As I have suggested here, one could consider the recent turn in the SEC’s 
behavior towards concern about human rights within the context of theoretical debates 
about materiality and the nature of our disclosure regime.  Further, discussions of the new 
role of capital markets, institutional investors, and of the different political camps that 
have emerged in response to globalization, add to our understanding of the PetroChina 
Syndrome.  But there is another theoretical framework that is perhaps even more helpful 
in understanding its potential long-term significance.  While the debate about corporate 
governance and the securities law regime is responsive to the issues raised by the 
separation of ownership and control, the same development in economic history – the rise 
of the large vertically integrated multinational corporation – created another problem, one 
that is analyzed by Massimo De Angelis in his recently published book entitled 
Keynesianism, Social Conflict and Political Economy.222
De Angelis describes a problem with which both John Maynard Keynes and the 
Polish economist Michael Kalecki, Keynes’ contemporary, grappled.  The emergence of 
the large industrial manufacturing concern required the creation of a large industrial 
working class, both to work in the new factories, such as Henry Ford’s massive River 
Rouge complex which employed 120,000 workers in a single site, and to consume the 
products of this new industrial economy, such as the Model A cars that started rolling off 
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the Rouge assembly line in the late 1920’s.  With this massive concentrated employment 
of industrial workers, De Angelis suggests Keynes and Kalecki understood, came a new 
confidence among those workers that employers needed them.  They could no longer be 
pushed so easily into unemployment to serve as a “reserve army of labor” which had 
undermined for many decades efforts to form stable and effective trade unions.  This new 
awareness emboldened workers to push for wage increases and improved working 
conditions, as reflected in the strike waves that hit the American economy in the mid-
1930’s and throughout World War II, even in the face of difficult economic conditions.  
Thus, De Angelis notes “the organizational and confrontational maturity of what was, 
following the Soviet revolution, Fordism and the Great Depression, a new kind of 
working class.”223
Keynes and Kalecki, as economists, argued that this new era of social conflict 
gave rise to a phenomenon known as “wage stickiness” or “wage rigidity”:  the prospect 
of unemployment, even in the depths of the Great Depression, no longer frightened 
employees with jobs into lowering wage demands, thus interfering with the self-
correcting role of markets.  “According to Keynes’ biographer Skidelsky… ‘the 
incomplete British recovery from the depression of 1920-1922 started Keynes on the road 
to the Keynesian Revolution.’  This incomplete recovery had revealed the persistence of 
unemployment and at the same time the rigidity of real wages.”224  This forced 
economists to grapple with a new world.  The heritage of “Say’s Law” – the world of the 
nineteenth century where “market forces” (i.e. the reserve army of labor) would drive 
223 Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added).
224 Id. at 17 (emphasis in original).
The PetroChina Syndrome
93
down the price of labor until it was once again profitable for capitalists to re-hire 
unemployed workers and hence end the Depression – had apparently been surpassed.225
As De Angelis argues, “the recognition of unemployment as a problem by economic 
theory (namely Keynesianism) originated out of the failure of downward movements of 
the business cycle to provide the traditional disciplinary device for both the employed 
and unemployed labor force.”226  Unemployment had ceased to play its counter-cyclical 
role in lowering wages to allow employers to begin expanding investment.
A new institutional structure had to be built to deal with this problem.  Without 
new institutions then employers would lose their control over the system of production 
and their motive for investing in new production.227  This was not an idle threat.  It had 
indeed happened in one extreme instance, in 1917, when the working class of Russia 
overthrew a weak capitalist regime that had only several months before overthrown the 
Russian monarchy.  While that workers’ regime was crushed in a brutal civil war and a 
new bureaucratic authoritarian government was soon installed under Stalin, the risk of 
conceding to workers’ power was clear to capitalist theoreticians like Keynes.  “Keynes’ 
revolution in economics can be understood as a reaction to working-class struggles in 
Europe and general insurgency in other parts of the world.  It is the product of the change 
in the balance of forces between classes during the struggles of the 1920s and 1930s and 
during the Second World War.”228
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Keynes, in fact, personally witnessed a dramatic version of these events when 
Britain’s government was nearly toppled by the General Strike of 1926.  On the eve of 
the Strike, Keynes admitted “[t]he trade unions are strong enough to interfere with the 
free play of the forces of supply and demand, and public opinion…supports the trade 
unions in their main contention that coal miners ought not to be the victims of cruel 
economic forces which they never put in motion.”229  The events of 1926 had a 
particularly deep impact on Keynes re-thinking of the role of class power in economic 
theory.  “Repressive policies had been called [for by some] on the basis of the fact that 
the strikers had broken the law.  ‘To those who clamoured that the General Strike was 
illegal and stepped outside the limits of constitutional action, Keynes gave a short reply: 
“That may be so, but so what?.” ’  The balance of forces has changed and [Keynes 
understood that] ‘legality must be adjusted to fit the new situation.’ ”230  Without a new 
institutional arrangement, the only alternative would be the kind of repression that was 
indeed taking place in the emerging Stalinist and fascist countries.  As Keynes admitted, 
“it is only in a highly authoritarian society, where sudden, substantial, all-round changes 
could be decreed that a flexible wage-policy could function with success.  One can 
imagine it in operation in Italy, Germany or Russia, but not in France, the United States 
or Great Britain.”231
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Thus, a central institutional outcome of the “Keynesian Revolution” was the 
emergence of the industrial relations system that dominated economic life in the 
advanced economies of the post-war world well into the late 1970’s.  At the heart of this 
new structure was what many stylized as a “social contract” between employers and 
workers under government supervision (or even at times control) where wage increases 
were granted over time in exchange for productivity increases.  In some countries these 
deals were, and remain, explicit (as in European and Japanese corporatism) or exalted (as 
in the Stalinist regimes) while they remained only implicit in others (as in the collective 
bargaining systems in the United States and the United Kingdom).  This Industrial 
Relations system promised a relatively equitable distribution of income, stability in 
economic growth, and only moderate divergence in growth patterns between countries.  
De Angelis terms this solution to the “wage rigidity” problematic identified by Keynes 
and Kalecki “the social microfoundations of Keynesianism.”232
But the system could not last forever.  As early as the 1960s, it became clear that 
firms were living on borrowed time, as De Angelis describes:
From the mid-1960’s many basic economic indicators showed a turning 
point.  Investments that were flourishing in the 1950s and 1960s turned 
sour and worsened after the 1974 oil crisis.  Business and manufacturing 
investment collapsed….Industrial profit rates began their downturn in the 
mid-1960s….Inflation began to approach double digits by the late 1960s.  
The welfare state appeared to crumble under weight of increasing deficits 
and exponential increases in public debts.  All these trends could be 
translated into DM [deutschemarks], lire, or pounds because the turning 
point was more or less evident in all major capitalist countries….233
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At the center of this crisis were the institutions, such as collective bargaining, that 
regulated labor-management relations.  What had once been a boon to capitalist success, 
the use of the industrial relations framework to regulate wages and productivity, became 
an albatross.  The industrial relations system had tended to lock in older technology due 
to management’s attempts to constrain worker power on the shop floor or because of 
management reluctance to confront that power.  This was linked to a second problem:  
the collective bargaining system was imposed from above to try and break the back of the 
idea that workers had independent power in a “full employment” economy.  Thus, the 
social microfoundations were political too and that imposition of a political system while 
offering some newly found stability or equity to workers, also chafed at the level of the 
rank and file worker.  Productivity was thus under attack.  “[I]f the ‘golden age’ had seen 
an impressive increase in productivity growth, the subsequent period suffered what 
numerous observers have called the ‘productivity slowdown.’  What is more important, 
productivity in most OECD countries grew less than money wages, thus leading to 
inflationary pressures as business tried to restore profit margins.”234  Sen. Edward 
Kennedy, a leading pro-labor Democrat, noted at the time “the effect that worker 
discontent has on productivity. The National Commission on Productivity states that in at 
least one major industry, absenteeism increased by 50%, worker turnover by 70%, 
worker grievances by 38%…and disciplinary lay-offs by 44% in a period of 5 years. How 
234 Id.
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much does that cost the economy in terms of low productivity?”235  The answer appeared 
to be significant.  One contemporaneous follower of the events noted, 
Absenteeism has important effects on production…. The cost of all this to 
management is enormous. For example in 1971, in the Oldsmobile 
Division of GM alone, the cost of absenteeism (considering only fringe 
benefits) was about $50 million. Turnover costs were another $29 
million….GM's labour costs rose from 29.5% of sales in 1962 to 33% in 
1972….The firm's investment per worker rose from $5,000 in 1950 to 
$24,000 in 1969. James Roche, Chairman of GM, commenting on these 
figures, said: 'tools and technology mean nothing if the worker is absent 
from his job' and went on to stress the domino effect of absenteeism on 
co-workers, on quality and efficiency, and on other GM plants with related 
production. 'We must receive a fair day's work for which we pay a fair 
day's pay'….236
As productivity and profitability slowed in the late 1960’s employers began to use 
the same institutional structure to ratchet up the pressure on workers.  Bargaining became 
tougher and the resolution of grievances through negotiations and arbitration slower.  
Some employers began to break away from the institutional structure to engage in 
aggressive union busting or runaway shops.  In the newly formed General Motors 
Assembly Division (“GMAD”), for example, management became particularly 
aggressive.  United Auto Workers Union President Leonard Woodcock called it “the 
roughest and toughest in GM.”237   At the Lordstown, Ohio, GMAD plant there were 100 
unresolved grievances when the Division took over.  That soon skyrocketed to 1400.  
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Workers began to react.  Sabotage of cars became frequent, absenteeism exploded and 
informally workers began to leave a certain percentage of cars unfinished as they sped 
along the assembly line.  The workers protests became so apparent that they even caught 
the eye of the national media when Time Magazine noted that at Lordstown, “autos 
regularly roll off the line with slit upholstery, scratched paint, dented bodies, bent gear-
shift levers, cut ignition wires, and loose or missing bolts.  In some cars, the trunk key is 
broken off in the lock, thereby jamming it.”238  The number of cars needing repairs before 
they left the plant ran so high the plant was often forced to close for lack of space.  A 
mini strike wave occurred in the United States, including a strike at Lordstown and 
numerous other auto plants and a wave of wildcat, or unofficial, strikes in several 
industries.  An even more intense strike wave hit much of Western and Eastern Europe.
France nearly descended into civil war in 1968 as factory occupations spread across the 
country.  Meanwhile to the south Italy experienced its “Hot Autumn” led by rank and file 
workers in 1969.  These battles were echoed in the eastern bloc where only Soviet tanks 
could suppress the Prague Spring of 1968and in Poland where major strike waves took 
place in 1970 and 1976 in the run-up to the emergence of the Solidarity movement in late 
1980.
Partially in response to this unrest, in the 1970s De Angelis argues, the advanced 
economies shifted gears gutting the decades old Industrial Relations system.  For De 
Angelis the archetypal figure of the twenty-five year period following WW II was 
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Keynes, but for the new era Milton Friedman emerged as the archetype.239  Friedman 
promoted the idea of liberalized exchange rates and, of course, the expansion of free 
market institutions.  These ideas began to take hold, first in the Nixon Administration and 
later more aggressively under Presidents Carter and Reagan.  The U.S. decision to 
suspend convertibility of the dollar into gold in 1971 signaled a break with the older 
institutional framework.  Now, increasingly, employers could expand their operations 
internationally as market institutions were spread to more and more countries and 
deregulation of currency trading increased their operational flexibility.240  These steps 
were crucial building blocks of the phenomenon now called “globalization.”  They 
heralded the arrival of a new disciplining force that could replace the Industrial Relations 
system and perhaps solve the problem of declining productivity and profitability.  No 
longer did employers have to engage in collective deals or social contracts with workers 
in order to trade wage gains for productivity increases nor did they have to engage in 
pitched battles at the factory gates and on the shop floor to raise productivity.  Now 
employers could rely on the entrance into the labor market, a new global labor market, of 
hundreds of millions of previously unavailable workers.  After all, if Mexico instituted 
genuine contract and property rights and a liberalized exchange regime and also offered 
cheap labor, it became far more attractive to auto industry executives to break up their 
troublesome, aging and expensive workforces in places like Flint, Michigan and move 
239 De Angelis at 144 (“Friedman’s (1968) presidential address to the American 
Economic Association…represented the…undermining of theoretical support for demand 
management policies”).
240 This explains in part the fierce opposition that emerges whenever economically 
troubled developing countries attempt to implement protective measures like currency 
controls.  See Auerback supra note ___.
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operations to the new non-union maquiladora zone in northern Mexico, replicating the 
runaway shop policy that the textile industry had put to such good use in moving to the 
southern United States to avoid Northern unions in the middle of the 20th century.241
Note here the important role that the capital markets can play.  Now that more 
than a trillion dollars are traded back and forth every day in the currency markets alone, 
those markets provide a kind of daily vote by key financial institutions on the 
attractiveness for investors of every country in the world.  Social welfare spending, union 
power over business decision making and other dimensions of the Keynesian era are now 
seen by many participants in these markets as introducing inefficiency and rigidity into 
economic development.  Sovereign debt instruments and domestic currencies are ripe for 
speculative attack as a form of political pressure.  As De Angelis notes:  “In a context of 
open capital markets, the simple announcement of a government’s Keynesian intentions 
may well be sufficient to bring the government to its knees via a massive capital 
outflow.”242
In the run-up to the Brazilian elections, for example, global speculators began a 
sell-off of Brazilian debt instruments and the Brazilian currency.243  This forced the 
241
 Harley Shaiken, Mexico in the Global Economy: High Technology and Work 
Organization in Export Industries (1990).  Of course, those textile mills have now for the 
most part moved on to places like Mexico and China as well.
242 De Angelis at 157.
243 Ian Campbell, Brazil’s hopeless defense, UPI, Oct. 17, 2002 (Brazilian “growth 
has…been modest because of the constant need to keep interest rates high in order to sell 
debt, attract foreign portfolio capital inflows and curb growth in imports and in the 
external deficit”); Simon Romero, Brazil Raises A Key Rate By 3 Points, Oct. 15, 2002 
(“an unexpected move in the middle of the standoff between Brazil’s government and 
financial institutions speculating about the direction of the real [Brazilian currency]”; 
Jonathan Wheatley, Brazil: Business likes Lula – But Wall Street doesn’t, Business 
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government to raise interest rates on financial assets denominated in the domestic 
currency to try and stop the sell-off.244  That, in turn, only made the domestic economic 
situation worse as the cost of financing the government budget increased dramatically.  
The prospect of the election of leftish former labor leader, Luis Inacio da Silva, known 
popularly as “Lula,” “ha[d] Wall Street freaked.  Ever since last spring, when the first 
polls showed Lula with the lead, credit agencies and New York investment 
banks…issued dire warnings and downgraded Brazil’s [credit] ratings, causing Brazil’s 
currency to plummet and helping to precipitate” an IMF bailout.245  The government was 
forced to negotiate a stringent agreement with the International Monetary Fund that 
placed a severe restriction on government spending.  In a highly unusual development, 
candidates in the ongoing presidential campaign were forced to sign on to a commitment 
to abide by the IMF restrictions if they were elected.  In the new era, the post-Keynesian 
era, the global capital markets provide capitalism with the essential disciplinary device 
necessary to assure profitability.246
In this environment, industrial relations, collective bargaining, even unions 
themselves, are not just out-gunned, they at first glance appear to be truly irrelevant.  As 
De Angelis noted, “financial integration and liberalization allows capital mobility to 
Week, Oct. 14, 2002; Soros slams antsy markets facing Brazil’s leftist candidate, AFX 
European Focus, Oct. 8, 2002.
244 In late 2002, benchmark Brazilian interest rates stood at 25%.  John Barham, Heading 
out the storm, LatinFinance, Feb. 1, 2003 at 16; Interest rate is increased after all; New 
signal to the markets gets poor response, Latin American Newsletters, Jan. 28, 2003 at 
41.
245 Franklin Foer, Radical Solution, The New Republic, Sept. 23, 2002 at 15.
246 Id.
The PetroChina Syndrome
102
serve as a disciplinary device to limit the scope of any concessions by individual 
governments that could harm national competitiveness and to present ‘adjustments’ in 
terms of cuts in welfare spending and entitlements as a necessity posited from the 
outside.”247
Part VI: Confronting the Legitimation Deficit
As powerful as this argument is in explaining the new era, however, it leaves out 
a second concern triggered by globalization, a concern that is at the heart of our legal 
system, a concern about legal process, secured in part by the institutions of labor law.  
Only an understanding of this dimension of the Industrial Relations era allows us to see 
the potential for a progressive, labor-led response to the issues posed by the new Capital 
Markets era.  While De Angelis emphasizes in his assessment of the Keynesian era the 
economic effects of a particular institutional arrangement, he fails to recognize an equally 
important aspect of the industrial relations system, namely, its ability to put in place a 
workplace rule of law that helped to legitimate the outcome of wage -productivity 
bargaining.  What some have called “American approach to industrial relations”248 was 
247
 De Angelis at 151.
248 Diamond 1996 at 218; for a sophisticated critique see Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The 
Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 Yale L.J. 1509 (1981) (“the industrial 
pluralist metaphor of the plant as a mini-democracy…[is] mere illusion”).  Note that my 
argument comes at this question from a slightly different angle, suggesting that it is 
internal workplace conflict that pushes its way outward to a battle over broader 
democratic principles while at the same time generating periodic compromises that are 
seen as legitimate stalemates or cease-fires between employer and employee.  See also 
Katherine Stone, The Structure of Post-War Labor Relations, 11 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. 
Change 125 (1982-1983); Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union 
Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 495 (1993) for 
further discussion of inward legitimation effect of Wagner Act.
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based on the promotion of a common law of the shop floor that developed out of 
organizing campaigns, grievance processing and contract negotiations.  This system was 
created by a series of statutes, beginning with the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 
(often referred to as the “Wagner Act” after its chief legislative author, Sen. Wagner),249
and later institutionalized by several important Supreme Court decisions, notably the 
famous Steelworkers Trilogy cases of the early 1960’s.250  As Justice Douglas said in one 
of those crucial opinions:
The collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties of the parties. It is 
more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which 
the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate….The collective agreement covers the 
whole employment relationship….It calls into being a new common law -- the 
common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant….A collective 
bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial self-
government.251
This new approach was as much a result of popular protest through widespread 
strikes in the 1930’s, including three general strikes in San Francisco, Minneapolis and 
Toledo, as it was a product of legislative and judicial effort.  The centerpiece of the new 
industrial relations system was the National Labor Relations Board, established by the 
1935 Act.  Its role in monitoring and adjudicating labor-management conflict was an 
attempt to take the emerging class warfare then breaking out on the streets of major 
249
 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151-169 (1935).
250
 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United 
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United 
Steelworkers Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
251 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-
80 (1960) (emphasis added).
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American cities back to the negotiating table by setting up a process for union recognition 
while limiting the ability of workers to continue more radical efforts to control the 
production process.  As a 1961 study cited by labor law scholar Katherine Van Wezel 
Stone concluded: “The gains from this system [of industrial relations] are especially 
noteworthy because of their effect on the recognition and dignity of the individual 
worker….Wildcat strikes and other disorderly means of protest have been curtailed and 
an effective work discipline generally established.”252  The Wagner Act, therefore, can be 
seen as a “double-edged sword,” a legal instrument that cut both ways, in favor initially, 
it seemed, of workers, but over time providing the framework for severely curtailing 
worker power.  As labor law historian Karl Klare has noted, “the liberal model of 
industrial democracy simultaneously invites and limits employee participation in 
workplace governance.”253  The fact that it provided procedures such as mandatory 
bargaining and grievance procedures for workers to attempt to secure basic 
improvements in their lives helped cement acceptance of the compromise.254
A broader claim was also made for the industrial relations system.  Figures like 
John Dunlop, George Schultz and Clark Kerr argued more or less explicitly that it 
provided a base for the vision of liberal pluralism they felt was essential to govern 
252 Independent Study Group of the Committee of Economic Development, The Public 
Interest in National Labor Policy 32 (1961), cited in A. Cox, D. Bok, & R. Gorman, 
Labor Law 571 (8th ed. 1977) cited in Stone supra note ___ at 1576. 
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Progressive Critique 539, 561 (David Kairys ed.) (1998); Karl E. Klare, Judicial 
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 
1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978).
254 But see Stone supra note ___ at 1577 (industrial relations system suffers from an 
“antinomy” such that “the more successful the theory [of industrial pluralism] is as a tool 
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industrial society.  In the view of these “strong IR” figures, modern industrial capitalism 
was a world where competing centers of power – labor, government and business – each 
had a legitimate role in broader political and social life.  Thus a more formalized tripartite 
relationship was the stabilizing core of a system that allowed the rapid change and 
development inherent in capitalism’s waves of “creative destruction” to take place 
without triggering radical or destructive reactions.  Clark Kerr, for example, wrote of “the 
contribution of the unions to a sense of consensus in industrial society, to the sense that 
the rules and rewards are just and acceptable, and to how they thus lead to social 
tranquility….the overall impact of unionization has been to contribute to a sense of fair 
play, a sense of acceptance of the arrangements of industrial society.”255
This is not just a matter of appearances.  The basic building blocks of an active 
and democratic labor movement are the right to organize, the right to bargain 
collectively, and the right to strike.  These rights run parallel to basic political rights 
found in general social life – the right to assembly, the right to freedom of speech, and 
the right to petition the government for the redress of grievances.  Thus the “common law 
of the shop floor” runs parallel to democratic governance in society at large.  Just as the 
common law that emerges inside the workplace guarantees that there is some check 
against arbitrary power in economic life, federal and constitutional structures provide a 
countervailing force against abuse of power in the polity as a whole, whether as checks 
on the assumption of power by a single individual or unrestricted abuse of 
majoritarianism.  In fact there is an essential link between these two parallel processes 
that explains the fact that with the exception of authoritarian or totalitarian societies labor 
255
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movements inevitably become involved in political activity.  There is a reciprocal 
relationship between the expression of civil liberties inside a workplace and in society at 
large.  A vibrant and effective trade union is impossible to sustain as an island of freedom 
in a sea of authoritarianism.  The right to organize, for example, depends vitally on the 
freedom of speech.  Thus, to preserve their successes at the workplace labor unions must 
also continually defend civil liberties in the outside political realm.  Conversely, those in 
society at large who value civil liberties recognize their importance inside the workplace 
as well.  Thus, in recent years, human rights organizations like Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch have paid increased attention to labor rights issues.  The existence 
of a vibrant trade union movement, then, is often a litmus test for a country’s progress 
towards democracy and freedom.  This is the substance of the “pluralism” of the 
Industrial Relations era.  The value we place on a process of “deliberative and pluralistic 
decision-making”256 is central to the legitimation of the outcomes of that decision-
making.
For De Angelis this perspective on the role of trade unions is a difficult one to 
comprehend.  He views the new trade union movement of the 1930s not as adversarial 
effort to represent the interests of workers, but as bodies “institutionalized by the 
state…to control the grass-roots.”257  Of course, if this were an accurate description it 
256 Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44 
Hastings Law Journal 185, 186 (1993).
257
 De Angelis at 49.  De Angelis is not alone in this view of the emergence of the 
modern American labor movement in the 1930s.  De Angelis’ perspective is not simply 
that of an obscure Italian commentator, though it echoes the views of figures like Antonio 
Negri who helped found the “autonomist” tendency to which De Angelis belongs.  An 
echo of this viewpoint is found in the United States in the work of Staughton Lynd.   See 
“We Are All Leaders” – The Alternative Unionism of the Early 1930s (Staughton Lynd, 
ed., 1996).
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would not have been possible for the unions to play the role that Kerr describes.  Only an 
organization that has some legitimacy with its own membership could have engaged in 
the compromises he describes and survive.258   Nor would an institution whose only role 
was to impose outcomes negotiated in smoke filled back rooms on a compliant rank and 
file be able to animate the wider activity of that same rank and file in general political 
and social life, as the “strong IR” view suggests was the case.  The labor movement must 
inevitably wrestle with its need to confront employers and, on occasion, the state, in order 
to win material improvements for its membership while simultaneously remaining 
concerned with survival in a persistently hostile environment.  This is not a dynamic that 
De Angelis seems to understand.  In one sense, Kerr and De Angelis are flip sides of the 
same coin, with Kerr hoping for the integration of the trade unions into a wider capitalist 
apparatus, and De Angelis thinking the deed has been done.  De Angelis mistakes the 
more conservative pronouncements of trade union officials for the actual labor movement 
itself.259  Kerr, at least, would acknowledge the existence of an adversarial relationship, 
258
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while De Angelis at the end of the day cannot see this as a realistic phenomenon.  That is 
why he cannot see any role for the adversarial process in creating legitimacy in the 
Keynesian era.
If the transition from a collective bargaining dominated system to one where 
global capital markets play a central role preserves the disciplinary function still so 
crucial to modern capitalism, it has left behind the central legitimating impact of the 
sophisticated system of process generated by industrial relations.  The missing element in 
today’s environment is precisely what figures like Clark Kerr thought was so crucial 
about the earlier framework – the institutions that developed “a sense of consensus.”  
Kerr went even so far as to suggest that unions’ ability to help generate this consensus 
“may well be their one great justification.  It is easier to get the appearance of economic 
justice than to be certain about its reality – and the unions give the appearance.”260  While 
many may argue with Kerr’s suggestion about the actual impact of unionization, there 
can be little argument that this contribution to “consensus” is absent in the era of 
globalization.  Unions still exist, of course, but they have suffered significant losses in the 
face of rapid technological change fed by the emergence of new global labor markets.  
No institutional framework remotely comparable to that of the Keynesian era exists to 
mediate class conflict over the process of economic development.  Instead, unforgiving 
global capital markets force reluctant players into line but with little or no opportunity for 
impacted social groups to debate or engage decision makers.  Instead of constructive 
dialogue and conscious planning of economic activity that addresses the entire social cost 
of rapid economic change, those most intimately impacted by such change are often left 
260
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with only violence or apathy as a way out.  This takes a very mild form in the United 
States, for the time being, but it is altogether different in many parts of the world.
Thus, there is no sense emerging that this is a system committed to what Kerr 
called a “sense of fair play.”  Quite the opposite, in fact, as a broad sector of the 
population in both advanced and developing countries have begun to express their view 
that the new era is an intensely unfair one.  This was manifested most openly at the 
demonstrations against the World Trade Organization in Seattle in 1999.  The protests 
there ranged across the political and social spectrum, including both middle class 
environmentalists and working class trade unionists.  Thus, this legitimation deficit
suggests the emergence of a vacuum in social and political life.  Whether it will be filled 
by regulation or altered private behavior or open social conflict or perhaps all three is not 
yet clear.  But the anti-globalization/pro-globalization divide is not simply about the 
division of spoils, not simply about the fights between winners and losers, it is also about 
power – power to influence, power to participate, power to debate.  This concern with 
power is the emerging content of process in the anti-globalization era.  The possibility 
that this content will be shaped by destructive conflict or even reactionary or 
fundamentalist movements is what leads me to suggest the possibility of an emerging 
PetroChina Syndrome, where social groups with significant concerns about the impact of 
the new era are locked out of decision-making processes and are forced to turn to more 
radical solutions.  A legal order that promises to protect the general interest but fails to 
provide accessible, transparent and accountable mechanisms to generate legitimate 
outcomes can only be said to be suffering a legal pathology.
The PetroChina Syndrome
110
Conclusion
The PetroChina Campaign represented an important and innovative first step in 
the constructive forging of a genuinely legitimate new world order and thus is evidence 
of that pathology but also points to its resolution.  By its tactics, its agenda and choice of 
methods it sent a strong signal about the inadequacies of the current neo-liberal regime.  
It represented the emerging outline of a new model of global economic development.  On 
a tactical level, it chose to bring politics into the capital markets where they are 
manifestly unwelcome.  Thus, it forced the recognition of the political impact and 
relevance of those markets.  The capital markets cannot any longer be seen, as Alan 
Greenspan would prefer, as simply passive intermediaries betweens savers and investors.  
They are inherently political because they impact social outcomes.  But they violate the 
fundamental precepts of a legitimate political order.  They provide no institutional 
mechanism to hold them accountable for their impact.  What the PetroChina campaign 
illustrated was that the normal mechanisms that are supposed to guarantee the so-called 
“integrity” of the markets broke down when they attempted to digest the mix of an 
authoritarian economy with a democratic one.  The PetroChina IPO represented an 
attempt to impose a particular social and economic order that corresponds to the needs of 
those few with the resources and ability to take advantage of those markets.  The fact that 
the Chinese regime was forced to bring an abrupt halt to its global capital markets 
strategy indicates the effectiveness of the tactical choice to intervene in those markets 
made by the Campaign.  
The agenda of the Campaign grew largely out of the range of issues raised by the 
“new internationalism” fostered by the Sweeney Administration at the AFL-CIO but also 
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reflected in the efforts of many NGO’s in the human rights and environmental activist 
communities.  In what are likely to be only fortuitous circumstances linked to China’s 
particular political history, the agenda was fortified by the presence of conservative 
religious groups concerned about religious freedom.  But even among conservatives there 
is a growing concern about the impact that neo-liberal globalization is having on 
traditional ways of life.261  The agenda expanded into arguments about the appropriate 
forms of corporate governance in the new era.  In the post-Enron environment such a 
concern looks remarkably prescient.  Thus, it can be fairly said, that in a single effort the 
Campaign raised awareness of some of the most of the significant dimensions of the 
globalization process.  In many ways the Campaign is an echo of the efforts by organizers 
like Walter Reuther and A.J. Muste in the early 1930s to call attention to the social costs 
of the new market driven industrial order.  A similar effort was made by figures like 
Holmes, Brandeis, Florence Kelley and Rose Schneiderman in the Progressive movement 
of the late 19th and early 20th century to battle sweatshops and tyranny in the workplace.
Finally, in its choice of methods – addressing its concerns first to the stewards of 
the retirement assets managed by large institutional investors and then to regulators – the 
Campaign found a new way to press for progressive reform.  Institutional investors are 
significant new players in the global economy.  They are becoming aware of the weight 
of that responsibility and cannot afford to hide behind narrow definitions of “fiduciary 
duty” while their assets are manipulated by Wall Street fund managers and investment 
banks at significant cost to the values and goals of the fund beneficiaries, American 
workers.  Using the power and influence of these institutions to force the Securities and 
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Exchange Commission to acknowledge the importance of the Campaign’s agenda to 
investors, as it did with the issuance of the Unger Letter, represents a small but notable 
step towards responding to the emergence of the legitimation deficit created by the 
globalization process.
The outcome of this process cannot be predicted.  What can be recognized and 
accepted, however, is that we are confronting an entirely new set of problems.  In the 
past, in the era of Holmes or Douglas, for example, constructive and progressive 
responses to such problems have emerged by, first, recognizing that a problem exists, 
and, second, by asking, through research and argument, what the real dimensions of that 
problem are.  Only then can we move to constructive institution building that helps 
resolve the problems.  The emergence of the PetroChina Syndrome can be seen as a 
social variant of the miner’s canary – warning us that there is, indeed, the possibility of 
an explosion. 
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